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VV)       THE  CRISIS  IN  THE  FORMER  YUGOSLAVIA  AND 
\  THE  U.S,  ROLE 

Y  4.  F  76/1:  Y  9/4 


The  Crisis  in  the  Forner  Yugoslavia... 


x.x^RING 

BEFORE  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS 
HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE  HUNDRED  THIRD  CONGRESS 
FIRST  SESSION 


SEPTEMBER  29,  1993 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 


JAN  2$ 


U.S.   GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
75-703  CC  WASHINGTON  :  1993 

For  sale  by  the  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  Congressional  Sales  Office,  Washington,  DC  20402 
ISBN   0-16-041783-X 


THE  CRISIS  IN  THE  FORMER  YUGOSLAVIA  AND 

THE  U.S,  ROLE 

Y  4.  F  76/1:  Y  9/4 

The  Crisis  in  the  Forner  Yugoslavia... 

xx^^RING 

BEFORE  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS 
HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE  HUNDRED  THIRD  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 


SEPTEMBER  29,  1993 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 


> AH  ?4  /( 


U.S.   GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
73-703  CC  WASHINGTON   :  1993 

For  sale  by  the  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  Congressional  Sales  Office.  Washington.  DC  20402 
ISBN   0-16-041783-X 


COMMITTEE  ON  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS 


LEE  H.  HAMILTON,  Indiana,  Chairman 


SAM  GEJDENSON,  Connecticut 

TOM  LANTOS,  California 

ROBERT  G.  TORRICELLI,  New  Jersey 

HOWARD  L.  BERMAN,  California 

GARY  L.  ACKERMAN,  New  York 

HARRY  JOHNSTON,  Florida 

ELIOT  L.  ENGEL,  New  York 

ENI  F.H.  FALEOMAVAEGA,  American 

Samoa 
JAMES  L.  OBERSTAR,  Minnesota 
CHARLES  E.  SCHUMER,  New  York 
MATTHEW  G.  MARTINEZ,  California 
ROBERT  A.  BORSKI,  Pennsylvania 
DONALD  M.  PAYNE,  New  Jersey 
ROBERT  E.  ANDREWS,  New  Jersey 
ROBERT  MENENDEZ,  New  Jersey 
SHERROD  BROWN,  Ohio 
CYNTHIA  A.  MCK1NNEY,  Georgia 
MARIA  CANTWELL,  Washington 
ALCEE  L.  HASTINGS,  Florida 
ERIC  FINGERHUT,  Ohio 
PETER  DEUTSCH,  Florida 
ALBERT  RUSSELL  WYNN,  Maryland 
DON  EDWARDS,  California 
FRANK  MCCLOSKEY,  Indiana 
THOMAS  C.  SAWYER,  Ohio 

(Vacancy) 

Michael  H.  Van  Dusen,  Chief  of  Staff 

RICHARD  J.  GARON,  Minority  Chief  of  Staff 

DEBORAH  BURNS,  Staff  Associate 


BENJAMIN  A.  GILMAN,  New  York 
WILLIAM  F..  GOODLING,  Pennsylvania 
JAMES  A.  LEACH,  Iowa 
TOBY  ROTH,  Wisconsin 
OLYMPIA  J.  SNOWE,  Maine 
HENRY  J.  HYDE,  Illinois 
DOUG  BEREUTER,  Nebraska 
CHRISTOPHER  H.  SMITH,  New  Jersey 
DAN  BURTON,  Indiana 
JAN  MEYERS,  Kansas 
ELTON  GALLEGLY,  California 
ILEANA  ROS-LEHTINEN,  Florida 
CASS  BALLENGER,  North  Carolina 
DANA  ROHRABACHER,  California 
DAVID  A.  LEVY,  New  York 
DONALD  A.  MANZULLO,  Illinois 
LINCOLN  DIAZ-BALART,  Florida 
EDWARD  R.  ROYCE,  California 


(ID 


CONTENTS 


Page 

WITNESSES 

Mr.  Misha  Glenny,  author  and  former  BBC  correspondent  2 

Mr.  Roy  Gutman,  author  and  Newsday  correspondent  4 

Hon.  Jeane  Kirkpatrick,  senior  fellow,  American  Enterprise  Institute  6 

Professor  John  Lampe,  director,  East  European  Studies,  Woodrow  Wilson 

Center 8 

APPENDED 

Prepared  statements: 

Mr.  Roy  Gutman  37 

Hon.  Jeane  Kirkpatrick 44 

Professor  John  Lampe  52 

Material  Submitted  for  the  Record 

"Serbia's  Health  Catastrophe",  International  Herald  Tribune  article,  dated 
August  23,  1993  55 

"Bosnian  Muslims  Gains   May  Have   High   Cost",   Washington   Post   article, 

dated  September  12,  1993  56 


(III) 


THE  CRISIS  IN  THE  FORMER  YUGOSLAVIA 
AND  THE  U.S.  ROLE 


WEDNESDAY,  SEPTEMBER  29,  1993 

House  of  Representatives, 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs, 

Washington,  DC. 

The  committee  met,  pursuant  to  call,  at  10  a.m.,  in  room  2172, 
Rayburn  House  Office  Building,  Hon.  Lee  H.  Hamilton  (chairman) 
presiding. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  The  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  will 
come  to  order. 

The  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  meets  today  in  open  session 
to  discuss  the  crisis  in  the  former  Yugoslavia  and  U.S.  policy. 

We  meet,  of  course,  at  an  important  moment  in  the  Bosnian 
peace  process,  at  a  time  when  the  United  States  may  be  confronted 
with  key  decisions  regarding  its  role  in  implementing  a  possible 
peace  agreement.  The  President  of  the  United  States  has  stated  his 
willingness  for  U.S.  participation  in  such  a  mission  if  certain  condi- 
tions are  satisfied,  and  has  stated  that  he  will  seek  support  in  the 
Congress  for  such  participation.  Of  course,  no  agreement  has  been 
reached  as  of  this  moment. 

Our  witnesses  today  are  Misha  Glenny,  author  and  former  BBC 
correspondent  in  Yugoslavia  and  Central  Europe;  Roy  Gutman,  an 
author  and  Newsday  correspondent;  the  Honorable  Jeane  Kirk- 
patrick,  senior  fellow  at  the  American  Enterprise  Institute — I  un- 
derstand she  will  be  here  shortly;  and  Professor  John  Lampe,  direc- 
tor of  East  European  Studies  at  the  Woodrow  Wilson  Center. 

We  welcome  each  of  you  here  today.  Your  statements,  of  course, 
will  be  entered  into  the  record  in  full,  and  I  would  like,  before  turn- 
ing to  Mr.  Gilman  for  a  statement,  to  ask  each  of  you  to  try  to  take 
no  more  than  5  minutes  for  your  opening  remarks.  We  will  have 
plenty  of  time  for  questions. 

And  I  might  say  to  Members  here  that  I  will  have  to  be  fairly 
strict,  I  think,  in  enforcing  the  5-minute  rule,  and  ask  them,  if  they 
would,  to  watch  carefully  the  lights.  We  have  a  lot  of  ground  to 
cover  and  we  want  to  maximize  time  for  discussion. 

The  chair  recognizes  Mr.  Gilman. 

Mr.  Gilman.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  want  to  commend  you 
for  your  foresight  in  scheduling  today's  hearing,  which  falls  against 
the  dramatic  backdrop  of  an  imminent  decision  on  whether  our  Na- 
tion should  commit  25,000  or  more  troops  into  the  Bosnia  area. 

I  would  like  to  welcome  our  distinguished  panel  of  experts  on  the 
Balkan  Region  and  what  was  once  Yugoslavia. 

(l) 


We  are  pleased  that  we  have  participating  two  distinguished 
journalists,  Mr.  Glenny  and  Mr.  Gutman,  both  of  whom  have  writ- 
ten extensively  about  politics  and  life  and  death  in  that  tragic  part 
of  the  world  and  helped  to  educate  the  American  public  with  regard 
to  this  issue. 

Professor  John  Lampe,  who  directs  the  Woodrow  Wilson  Center's 
East  European  Studies  Program  has  provided  a  great  deal  of  his 
expertise  on  this  subject  for  the  benefit  of  our  Members. 

I  also  want  to  thank  Ambassador  Jeane  Kirkpatrick  for  agreeing 
to  appear  before  us,  and  we  anticipate  she  will  be  arriving  shortly. 
Our  Nation  has  benefited  tremendously  from  Ms.  Kirkpatrick's 
leadership  in  foreign  affairs  over  the  years,  and  we  hope  to  have 
Ms.  Kirkpatrick's  wisdom  on  what  promises  to  be  a  critical  and  dif- 
ficult foreign  policy  decision  now  looming  before  us. 

We  welcome  Ms.  Kirkpatrick  to  the  panel. 

I  will  not  try  to  do  justice  to  the  enormity  of  the  tragedy  that  is 
being  played  out  in  the  former  Yugoslavia.  Let  me  just  note  that 
it  is  one  of  the  most  shocking  and  disturbing  spectacles  which  we 
have  had  the  misfortune  to  be  subject  to  during  this  tumultuous 
and  violent  century. 

The  fact  that  once  again  we  are  observing  in  Europe  the  inflic- 
tion of  unspeakable  human  misery  in  the  name  of  ethnic  purity 
and  supremacy  raises  a  most  disturbing  specter  of  Europe's  recent 
dark  past.  There  is  a  nightmarish  quality  of  deja  vu  in  the  events 
in  Bosnia  and  elsewhere  in  what  was  once  Yugoslavia. 

Now  we  have  the  prospect  that  American  lives  may  be  placed  on 
the  line  once  again.  We  must  focus  our  most  critical  judgment  and 
obtain  the  very  best  advice  we  can  on  the  forces  which  shape  those 
events. 

I  join  my  colleagues  in  looking  forward  to  hearing  our  witnesses 
today  to  help  us  further  explore  this  crisis  and  to  fully  examine  our 
options. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  The  chair  has  been  informed  that  there 
have  been  some  mixed  signals  with  regard  to  the  timing  here.  I 
didn't  know  about  that.  But  we  want  to  operate  in  such  a  way  that 
we  have  an  opportunity  to  hear  you  all.  I  think  in  the  question  and 
answer  part  of  it  we  will  be  able  to  explore  these  matters  in  some 
depth. 

I  would  request  the  members  of  the  panel  to  try  to  get  their  prin- 
cipal points  across  to  us  in  5  minutes  initially,  and  then  we  will 
proceed  with  questions. 

And  I  will  say  to  my  colleagues  that  we  will  try  to  do  the  same 
with  Members,  and  if  you  remain,  we  will  come  around  to  you  on 
a  second  round. 

OK  Let's  just  go  across  the  line  here.  We  will  begin,  Mr.  Glenny, 
with  you  and  move  from  my  left  to  right  across  the  table. 

I  thank  each  one  of  you  for  coming  and  let's  begin.  Mr.  Glenny. 

STATEMENT  OF  MISHA  GLENNY,  AUTHOR,  AND  FORMER  BBC 
CORRESPONDENT  FOR  YUGOSLAVIA  AND  CENTRAL  EUROPE 

Mr.  Glenny.  Thank  you. 

Few  dispute  the  depth  of  the  agony  suffered  by  all  peoples  inhab- 
iting the  former  Yugoslavia,  above  all,  the  Muslims  of  Bosnia- 


Hercegovina  who,  in  a  fundamental  respect,  are  incidental  victims 
of  a  Serbo-Croat  war.  At  the  outset,  however,  I  wish  to  stress  that 
the  dead,  estimated  at  between  the  220,000  and  270,000,  the  in- 
jured, and  the  displaced  of  Croatia  and  Bosnia-Hercegovina  are  the 
result  of  a  limited  war  in  the  Northern  Balkans. 

This  region  is  pregnant  with  a  far  greater  potential  for  violence 
than  that  which  observers  like  myself  have  been  misfortunate 
enough  to  witness  firsthand  since  June  1991.  If  the  fighting  in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina  does  not  come  to  an  end  before  the  winter,  not 
only  are  we  assured  of  the  most  unspeakable  humanitarian  catas- 
trophe, but  the  possibility  of  that  limited  war  turning  into  an  un- 
bridled orgy  of  destruction.  That  possibility  will  increase 
exponentially  this  winter. 

A  continued  war  in  Bosnia-Hercegovina  will  lead  inexorably  to 
the  extermination  of  the  Muslim  population  of  that  country.  It  will 
also  accentuate  existing  tensions  within  Croatia  and  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Yugoslavia,  two  weak  but  well-armed  and  psychotic 
states  who  themselves  are  in  a  state  of  frozen  war. 

Leaving  aside  the  moral  and  political  issues  raised  by  the  threat 
to  the  Muslims  of  Bosnia-Hercegovina,  the  destabilization  of  Cro- 
atia and  the  rump  Yugoslavia  will  have  a  disastrous  impact  on 
their  neighbors,  particularly  in  the  south  of  the  Balkans.  Any 
spread  of  the  current  war,  be  it  a  revival  of  the  Serbo-Croat  war 
in  Croatia  or  the  ignition  of  armed  conflict  in  either  the  former 
Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  or  in  the  Serbian  region  of  Kosovo, 
will  catapult  European  security  into  a  new  and  exceptionally  dan- 
gerous orbit. 

As  a  consequence,  it  is  the  moral  and  political  imperative  of  the 
international  community  and  its  chief  constituent  members  in 
Western  Europe — the  United  States  and  Russia — to  give  their 
backing  to  the  peace  agreement  currently  under  consideration  by 
the  different  peoples  of  Bosnia-Hercegovina. 

Of  course,  the  division  of  Bosnia-Hercegovina  legitimizes  the  per- 
versity of  states  defined  by  nationality.  It  sets  a  very  distressing 
precedent  at  a  time  when  the  peoples  of  Eastern  Europe  are  redis- 
covering their  identities  and  old  claims  on  forgotten  or  lost  terri- 
tories are  being  revived. 

But,  in  the  case  of  the  former  Yugoslavia,  a  fractious  inter- 
national community  has,  from  the  start,  ignored  moral  and  political 
principles.  In  particular,  the  recognition  of  Croatia  before  the  state 
authorities  in  Zagreb  had  come  to  a  constitutional  arrangement 
with  its  rural  Serb  population  meant  that  the  international  com- 
munity gave  tremendous  succor  to  the  principle  of  states  based  on 
ethnic  identity. 

As  such,  Western  Europe,  in  the  first  instance,  and  the  United 
States,  have  contributed  to  the  carve-up  of  Bosnia-Hercegovina.  By 
dint  of  this  we  are  no  longer  in  a  position  to  respond  with  prin- 
ciples. We  must  respond  pragmatically  to  stop  the  spread  of  this 
war. 

The  peace  plan,  deeply  flawed  though  it  is,  will  enable  us  to 
apply  a  sticking  plaster  on  Bosnia's  gaping  wound.  This  gives  us 
some  precious  time  to  administer  preventative  medicine  to  the  en- 
tire region  before  that  wound  reopens. 


To  those  who  advocate  a  punitive  response  against  the  perceived 
villains  of  this  peace,  the  Serbs,  I  am  bound  to  pose  the  following 
questions. 

First,  if  the  United  States  were  to  announce  a  lifting  of  the  arms 
embargo  on  the  Bosnian  government  or  its  intention  to  bomb  Serb 
positions  in  Bosnia,  what  do  you  imagine  will  happen  to  the  Mus- 
lims in  Srebrenica,  Gorazde,  Zepa,  Bihac,  and  indeed  in  Sarajevo's 
Old  Town?  Well,  let  me  tell  you.  Those  Muslims  will  die  in  even 
larger  numbers  than  has  been  the  case  up  until  now. 

The  lifting  of  the  embargo  is  the  quickest  way  to  facilitate  that 
which  its  advocates  say  it  is  trying  to  prevent:  the  liquidation  of 
Bosnia's  Muslim  populations. 

Second,  I  must  ask  you  what  will  happen  in  Mostar?  Will  you 
bomb  the  Croats  as  well? 

Third,  what  will  you  do  to  the  Bosnian  army's  Sixth  Corps  in 
Central  Bosnia  which  has  perpetrated  sickening  atrocities  against 
innocent  Croat  civilians,  elderly  people  and  children  in  recent 
months.  Will  you  bomb  them  too: 

Of  course,  they  are  committing  these  atrocities  in  response  to  the 
atrocities  committed  against  their  own  people.  But  is  that  our  an- 
swer? To  encourage  a  spiral  of  vengeance? 

As  a  European,  I  would  finally  appeal  to  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  its  Congress,  and  indeed  its  President  to  help  Southeastern 
Europe  in  its  hour  of  need.  We  must  have  American  troops  to  su- 
pervise a  peace  deal  in  Bosnia.  Only  the  American  military  and  its 
NATO  allies  have  the  experience  and  ability  to  counter  the  destruc- 
tive forces  of  history  currently  ravaging  the  Balkans.  It  will  give 
us  a  2-to  3-year  period  in  which  we  can  diffuse  the  detonators  of 
war  which  threaten  not  just  what  is  left  of  Bosnia-Hercegovina,  but 
also  the  fragile  republics  of  Croatia,  Yugoslavia,  and  the  former 
Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia. 

Thank  you. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Glenny. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Mr.  Gutman. 

STATEMENT  OF  ROY  GUTMAN,  AUTHOR  AND  NEWSDAY 
CORRESPONDENT,  BASED  IN  BONN,  GERMANY 

Mr.  Gutman.  Mr.  Chairman,  and  Members  of  the  committee, 
first,  it  is  an  honor  for  me  and  for  my  newspaper  to  be  invited  to 
appear  before  you. 

My  published  reports,  in  a  sense,  constitute  my  testimony.  At  the 
same  time,  as  one  of  the  relatively  few  Americans  to  have  spent 
time  on  the  ground  and  to  have  reported  some  of  the  terrible 
events  that  have  occurred,  I  feel  obliged  to  make  such  knowledge 
or  analysis  as  I  have  available  to  any  serious  inquiry.  As  you  weigh 
the  steps  that  come  before  you,  it  may  be  helpful  to  review  what 
has  occurred. 

From  my  own  reporting,  I  am  convinced  that  there  has  been  a 
pattern  of  atrocities.  It  has  been  primarily,  but  not  exclusively,  car- 
ried out  by  the  Bosnian  Serb  armed  forces. 

The  pattern  includes  the  following:  the  destruction  and  siege  of 
villages  and  cities;  massacres;  extrajudicial  executions  of  unarmed 
civilians;  mass  deportations  and  subhuman  conditions  such  as  cat- 
tle cars;  the  rounding  up  of  enormous  numbers  of  men  and  a  small- 


er  number  of  women  in  camps  where  they  were  beaten  or  starved 
to  death;  the  systematic  rape  of  women;  the  singling  out  of  unmar- 
ried women  of  childbearing  age  to  rape;  the  setting  up  of  camps 
where  women  were  held  and  raped;  the  harassment;  the  robbery 
and  murder  of  refugees  in  flight;  the  destruction  of  every  last 
mosque;  and  now  it  appears  every  last  Roman  Catholic  church  in 
the  areas  under  Serb  control. 

There  are  only  estimates,  but  it  seems  quite  plausible  that 
200,000  people  have  died,  most  of  them  civilians  unable  to  defend 
themselves.  These  add  up  to  the  systematic  attempt  to  exterminate 
a  nation.  That  is  my  personal  conclusion. 

A  sizable  body  of  data  has  been  collected  by  human  rights  orga- 
nizations such  as  Helsinki  Watch,  and  the  U.S.  Government  has 
carried  out  a  significant  effort  to  gather  data.  It  has  made  only  a 
portion  of  the  material  available  to  the  public.  But  such  material 
as  our  Government  and  other  governments  have  gathered  leads  to 
an  overwhelming  and  clear  conclusion. 

The  U.N.  Security  Council  has  acknowledged  the  gravity  of  the 
crimes  by  setting  up  the  first  war  crimes  tribunal  since  Nurem- 
berg. Its  primary  assignment,  if  I  read  the  charter  of  it  correctly, 
is  to  investigate  charges  of  genocide.  This  assumes,  of  course,  that 
the  Security  Council  can  overcome  its  current  impasse  over  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  prosecutor. 

Within  the  State  Department,  the  experts  have  also  analyzed  the 
pattern  of  atrocities  and  concluded  that  it  is  genocide.  But  at  the 
political  level,  the  executive  branch  is  still  wrestling  with  what  to 
call  it.  It  recently  came  up  with  an  awkward,  and  I  think  inad- 
equate, description:  acts  of  genocide. 

Up  to  now,  no  Western  government  has  formally  determined  that 
this  is  genocide  under  the  Genocide  Convention.  And  I  start  with 
this  point  because  I  believe  that  defining  and  characterizing  the 
event  itself  is  the  fundamental  starting  point  for  any  analysis,  and 
analysis  has  to  be  the  basis  on  which  we  all  proceed.  Legally,  under 
the  International  Convention  on  Genocide  the  act  of  genocide  is  an 
attempt  to  eliminate  all  or  part  of  a  nation,  a  people  or  religious 
group,  and  to  prevent  that  group  from  reproducing. 

By  definition,  by  nature  genocide  is  a  continuing  event,  and  this 
genocide  is  a  continuing  event.  It  is  occurring  today  at  a  less  dra- 
matic level  than  previously.  In  fact,  some  of  the  previous  excesses, 
some  of  the  incredible  atrocities  that  have  been  reported,  were 
curbed  in  the  past  year,  partly  because  of  the  international  atten- 
tion focused  on  them.  But  genocide  continues,  possibly  because  no 
one  focuses  on  it  today. 

And  I  have  included  in  my  statement  a  number  of  examples, 
graphic  examples,  of  terrible  atrocities  that  have  occurred  in  the 
area  of  Northern  Bosnia  in  just  the  last  month. 

These  are  not  random  events  that  are  described  in  these  six  or 
seven  examples  here.  They  are  not  carried  out  by  uncontrolled 
forces.  They  are  the  result  of  decisions  carried  out  by  the  agents, 
by  the  authorities  who  run  Northern  Bosnia — namely,  the  Serb  au- 
thorities, or  the  region  called  "Herceg  Bosna,"  the  Bosnian-Croat 
authorities.  And  it  is  regrettable  that  international  attention  has 
ceased  to  focus  on  these  events. 


I  have  one  suggestion  which  I  am  making  in  my  statement  and 
I  want  just  to  bring  to  your  attention  at  the  very  beginning.  The 
U.S.  Government  has  collected  a  sizable  amount  of  data  on  the 
events  of  the  last  year,  both  in  the  Serb-controlled  areas  and  more 
recently  in  the  Croat-controlled  areas.  They  have  carried  out,  as  far 
as  I  can  make  out,  a  very  careful  analysis  of  the  data.  They  have 
figured  out,  really,  what  has  happened. 

This  information  is  available  in  the  U.S.  Government,  but  it  is 
not  yet  available  to  the  American  people.  It  is  still  classified.  And 
the  one  suggestion  I  would  like  to  make,  first  and  foremost,  is  that 
this  should  be  made  available  to  you,  to  us,  and  to  the  people,  so 
that  we  can  know  what  really  has  come  before,  before  proceeding 
to  the  next  step.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Thank  you  very  much  for  your  statement. 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Mr.  Gutman  appears  in  the  appen- 
dix.] 

Ambassador  Kirkpatrick. 

STATEMENT  OF  THE  HONORABLE  JEANE  J.  KIRKPATRICK, 
SENIOR  FELLOW,  AMERICAN  ENTERPRISE  INSTITUTE 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman  and  Members  of  the 
committee.  And  thank  you  for  giving  me  the  opportunity  to  share 
some  thoughts  with  you  on  recent  developments  in  Bosnia,  which 
continue  to  be  tragic,  and  also  on  the  proposal,  which  is  not  yet  for- 
mally on  the  table,  that  thousands  of  U.S.  troops  take  part  in  a 
massive  peacekeeping  effort  in  Bosnia. 

Several  issues  of  special  concern  to  me  are  present  in  the  pro- 
posed plan  for  peacekeeping  in  Bosnia.  I  summarize. 

One,  I  think  we  must  face  the  question:  Will  this  peacekeeping 
do  justice  to  basic  issues  concerning  the  use  of  force  and  respect  for 
territorial  integrity,  or  will  they  simply  involve  American  service- 
men in  enforcing  an  unjust  peace? 

Two,  is  it  consistent  with  the  responsibilities  of  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment to  the  U.S.  Armed  Forces?  Will  it  put  American  forces  in 
harm's  way  under  foreign  command,  U.N.  command,  under  rules  of 
engagement  which  do  not  permit  their  effective  defense? 

Three,  will  this  policy  have  a  reasonable,  containable  cost  borne 
equitably  among  NATO  members  and  other  participants?  Will  it 
count  toward  the  U.S.  payment  of  U.N.  peacekeeping  costs?  Or  will 
the  United  States  accept  the  Secretary  General's  insistence  that  if 
NATO  commands,  NATO,  and  not  the  U.N.,  pays? 

Four,  how  and  where  will  it  end? 

Five,  will  the  peacekeeping  approach  actually  contribute  to  peace 
in  Central  Europe  in  the  long  run,  or  will  it,  by  accepting  terri- 
torial conquest,  invite  further  aggression? 

I  would  like  to  comment  very  briefly  on  each  of  these  questions. 

I  would  begin  by  noting  that  traditional  peacekeeping  operations 
have  some  special  characteristics.  You  all  know  them.  They  are  set 
up  with  the  consent  of  the  parties.  They  are  neutral  between  the 
parties  to  a  conflict.  They  use  minimum  force  in  the  performance 
of  their  task.  They  are  carried  out  under  U.N.  supervision,  and 
they  tend  to  last  forever. 

Most  of  these  characteristics  are  not  present  in  Bosnia  and  will 
not  be.  Peacekeeping  in  Bosnia  could  not  reasonably  be  said  to  rest 


on  the  consent  of  the  parties.  As  we  all  know,  if  a  cease-fire  is  ar- 
rived at,  it  will  be  based  on  the  most  extreme  possible  duress  and 
on  conquest,  and  the  United  States  will  be  put  in  the  position  of 
enforcing  an  unjust  agreement. 

A  sovereign  nation,  Bosnia,  will  be  forced  to  sign  an  agreement 
that  violates  its  most  basic  interests,  its  territory,  its  sovereignty 
in  the  most  clear-cut  way,  I  believe,  of  any  nation  since  Czecho- 
slovakia, under  European  pressure,  was  coerced  into  signing  the 
Munich  Agreement.  That  is  not  a  spurious  analogy.  It  is,  I  think, 
a  very  apt  one. 

As  I  understand  it,  the  Clinton  administration  is  proposing  to 
take  part  in  a  massive  peacekeeping  operation  consisting  of  some 
50,000  NATO  troops,  with  the  United  States,  perhaps,  providing 
half  of  these  troops. 

I  further  understand  that  U.S.  troops  are  likely  to  be  placed  in 
the  southeastern  part  of  Bosnia-Hercegovina,  primarily  in  cities 
around  Sarajevo,  Mostar  and  Gorazde,  and  that  there  are  problems 
about  deployment,  of  course,  and  problems  about  cost. 

There  are  problems  about  the  duration  of  such  an  operation.  No 
one,  I  believe,  is  prepared  even  to  guess,  much  less  to  offer  a  seri- 
ous estimate,  of  when  such  an  effort  might  end  or  what  the  overall 
cost  of  such  an  effort  might  be,  or  what  will  be  the  rules  of  engage- 
ment for  U.S.  troops  in  Bosnia. 

We  all  know  that  normally  the  U.N.  rules  of  engagement — I 
mean  the  rules  of  engagement  for  U.N.  operations — are  established 
by  the  U.N.  Secretariat  and  they  include  the  minimum  possible  use 
of  force.  That  is  not  appropriate  and  is  extremely  dangerous  in  a 
situation  in  which  violence  is  the  basic  fact  of  life,  as  in  Bosnia. 

I  believe  there  is  another  path  and  that  it  is  better  late  than 
never.  The  other  path  involves  lifting  the  arms  embargo.  It  involves 
providing  arms  to  Bosnian  Muslims,  helping  them  with  American 
airpower.  The  first  step  toward  that  other  path  is,  I  think,  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Hyde  amendment. 

Mr.  Chairman,  just  one  word.  I  would  like  to  quote  the  National 
Security  Adviser  to  the  President,  Anthony  Lake,  who  said  last 
week,  "While  we  have  clear  reasons  to  engage  and  persist,  concern- 
ing Bosnia,  they  do  not  justify  the  extreme  cost  of  taking  unilateral 
responsibility  or  imposing  a  solution.  With  all  due  respect,  I  would 
like  to  suggest  that  a  superpower  such  as  the  United  States,  the 
only  existing  superpower,  has  an  impact  when  it  fails  to  act,  as 
well  as  when  it  acts.  We  are  already  involved  in,  or  'imposing  a  so- 
lution'" to  use  Anthony  Lake's  words,  and  it  is  an  unjust  solution 
and  the  extreme  costs  of  this  unjust  solution  that  we  are  engaged 
in  imposing — moral,  political  and  eventually  military  costs — lie  in 
not  helping  the  Bosnian  Muslims. 

I  believe,  if  necessary,  the  United  States  should  act  unilaterally, 
now  at  this  late  date,  to  assist  the  Bosnian  Muslims  in  this  dire 
situation.  Thank  you. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Thank  you  very  much,  Ambassador  Kirk- 
patrick. 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Ms.  Kirkpatrick  appears  in  the  ap- 
pendix.] 

We  will  conclude  the  formal  testimony  with  professor  Lampe. 


8 

STATEMENT  OF  JOHN  LAMPE,  DIRECTOR  OF  EAST  EUROPEAN 
STUDIES,  THE  WOODROW  WH.SON  CENTER 

Mr.  Lampe.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

A  last  window  of  opportunity  may  yet  open  in  the  war  over 
Bosnia-Hercegovina.  If  this  war,  on  tne  other  hand,  continues  now 
or  resumes  next  spring  it  will  surely  cost  many  more  thousands  of 
lives,  and  likely  spread  beyond  the  Bosnian  border,  most  likely  to 
Kosovo,  Macedonia  and  beyond. 

Such  a  wider  conflict  would  make  the  Bosnian  war's  threat  to 
European  security  and  to  the  democratic  transition  in  Southeastern 
Europe,  both  vital  U.S.  interests,  too  clear  but  too  late.  The  pres- 
ently proposed  partition  of  Bosnia-Hercegovina  is  hardly  attractive 
in  itself  by  Western  standards  of  human  rights.  It  doesn't  even 
measure  up  to  the  original  Vance-Owen  plan  with  its  minority 
rights  for  political  representation  and  refugees  returning.  But 
never  mind  that  spilt  milk. 

I  would  add  that  the  now  proposed  presence  of  U.S.  and  Western 
troops  does,  in  my  mind,  call  the  Munich  analogy  with  Czecho- 
slovakia in  1938  into  question.  There  were  no  British  or  French 
troops  sent  to  hold  the  remainder  of  Czechoslovakia,  minus 
Sudetenland,  against  the  Nazis  at  that  time. 

The  Clinton  administration  has  rightly  encouraged  the  Bosnian 
government  of  Alija  Izetbegovic  to  drive  the  hardest,  least  bad  bar- 
gain, that  it  can  with  the  Bosnian,  Serb  and  Croat  regimes.  Let 
them  continue  to  do  so. 

All  sides  of  the  forces  in  the  field,  however,  have  shown  no  sign 
of  being  able  to  observe  a  cease-fire,  let  alone  a  settlement,  by 
themselves.  Bosnian  government  representatives  in  particular  have 
long  insisted  that  only  the  presence  of  a  sizable  contingent  of  West- 
ern troops  on  the  ground,  with  the  United  States  in  the  lead,  can 
enforce  any  settlement,  and  then  only  under  aggressive  rules  of  en- 
gagement. 

So  exit  any  reconstituted  UNPROFOR  arrangement  and  its  pas- 
sive rules  of  engagement  and  enter  an  American-led  NATO  force 
that  offers,  in  my  judgment,  the  only  hope  for  establishing  peace 
long  enough  for  pressure  for  more  reasonable  politics  and  the  re- 
turn of  economic  rationality  to  assert  itself. 

Now,  the  Clinton  administration's  detailed  plan  for  just  such  a 
presence  has  come  forward,  but  with  a  set  of  qualifications  that 
makes  observers  like  myself  wonder  whether  it  is  intended  only  to 
promise  an  enforced  settlement,  another  promise,  and  then  provide 
no  likelihood  that  troops  will  actually  be  dispatched  or  paid  for. 

Among  the  qualifications  for  "getting  in"  that  I  find  most  trou- 
bling is  the  indeterminate  period  for  observing  that  all  sides  are 
not  only  observing  the  cease-fire  but  also  pulling  back  both  troops 
and  heavy  weapons.  Their  leaders  cannot,  I  fear,  trust  or  compel 
their  local  commanders  to  do  this  on  their  own. 

But  what  about  the  risk  of  U.S.  troops  facing  an  escalating  series 
of  Somalia-like  skirmishes  and  then  having  no  predictable  way  of 
getting  out?  All  the  various  armies  and  militias  in  Bosnia- 
Hercegovina  are  neither  well-trained  nor  tightly  disciplined.  They 
are  still  sufficiently  concentrated  and  controlled  to  be  far  more  vul- 
nerable to  the  striking  power  of  U.S.  troops  and  technology  includ- 
ing airpower  than  the  scattered  urban  guerrillas  of  Somali  war- 


lords,  and  the  troops  as  well  as  the  commanders  of  the  Bosnian 
forces,  the  Serbs  in  particular,  they  know  it,  as  a  number  of 
sources  have  assured  me. 

Now  "getting  out"  is  another  matter.  Some  open-ended  commit- 
ment to  turn  Bosnia-Hercegoyina  into  a  NATO  mandate  or  trust 
territory?  That  asks  too  much,  of  course.  The  administration  has 
spoken  of  staying  for  a  year.  Let  me  propose  one  year  with  man- 
dated consideration  of  renewal  for  another  year,  and  that  potential 
renewal  seems  to  me  a  significantly  better  guarantee  that  a  lasting 
wider  accommodation  from  Croatia  to  Macedonia  can  be  reached 
than  does  Senator  Nunn's  recent  proposal  for  "exit  and  lift,"  prom- 
ising to  lift  the  arms  embargo  on  the  Bosnian  Muslims  as  a  fare- 
well gesture. 

If  the  impending  settlement  fails,  unfortunately,  it  gives  those 
Muslim  commanders  not  under  direct  control  by  the  Bosnian  gov- 
ernment— and  there  are  such  people,  let  me  assure  you — an  incen- 
tive to  violate  the  settlement  in  order  to  gain  access  to  more  arms. 
We  should  not  underestimate,  by  the  way,  the  weaponry  and  sup- 
plies they  currently  receive.  Such  a  stipulation  would  tempt  Serb 
and  Croat  commanders  to  strike  first  before  Muslim  forces  could 
receive  or  deploy  new  arms. 

It  would  also  discourage  them  from  accepting  the  NATO  force  as 
a  guarantor  of  equal  accountability  for  all  sides  in  observing  the 
terms  of  settlement  and  paying  a  fair,  that  is  a  strict  and  severe 
price,  for  any  violation. 

I  would  add  that  the  proposed  concentration  of  U.S.  forces  in  Sa- 
rajevo, Mostar  and  Gorazde  does  afford  the  largely  urban  Muslim 
population  who  are,  or  as  Misha  Glenny  says,  the  principal  victims 
of  this  war,  an  overdue  guarantee  of  their  safety. 

Now  finally,  how  can  we  "encourage"  the  Serbian  government  of 
Slobodan  Milosevic  to  comply?  Only — be  patient  with  this  point — 
only  by  weakening  the  public  support  that  clumsy  and  needlessly 
comprehensive  sanctions  have  generated  for  Milosevic,  and  still 
worse  Vojislav  Seselj. 

August  public  opinion  polls  from  Serbia  shows  such  support  for 
these  two  now  rising  in  Belgrade  and  other  cities  whose  living 
standards  have  been  devastated  by  the  sanctions.  Their  popu- 
lations are  reversing  their  previous  opposition  to  old  Communists 
and  new  nationalists.  Let  us  lift  requirements  for  the  always  de- 
layed or  denied  permissions  for  food  and  medicine,  and  for  all  raw 
materials  and  equipment  connected  thereto,  requirements  that 
have  made  a  mockery  of  the  supposed  exemption  of  food  and  medi- 
cine. I  bring  along  the  Henry  Kamm  article  from  the  Herald  Trib- 
une, August  23,  1993,  detailing  the  consequences  of  these  require- 
ments. Promising  to  lift  all  sanctions  could  then  be  used  to  ensure 
Serbian  compliance  with  the  Bosnian  settlement  and  also  good 
faith  negotiations  with  Croatia  and,  lest  we  forget,  with  the  Alba- 
nian population  of  Kosovo,  patiently  keeping  their  powder  dry  for 
now. 

If  such  dealings  were  beyond  the  capacity  of  the  Milosevic  re- 
gime, so  much  the  better.  Let  us  then  deal  with  an  alternative  re- 
gime that  will  be  needed  in  any  case  to  restore  Serbia's  honorable 
place  as  a  European  state  and  nation. 

Thank  you. 


10 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Mr.  Lampe  appears  in  the  appendix.] 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Thank  you  very  much,  Professor  Lampe. 

One  of  the  things  we  asked  the  staff  to  do  was  to  give  us  a  panel 
that  would  give  us  a  variety  of  opinion,  and  I  think  we  achieved 
that,  probably  rather  successfully.  I  thank  you  for  your  statements 
and  also  for  keeping  your  remarks  brief.  I  think  that  will  facilitate 
our  discussion. 

I  want  to  say  again  to  members  that  I  will  try  to  enforce  quite 
strictly  the  5-minute  rule  on  questions. 

PEACE  PLAN 

Let  me  be  begin  with  what  appears  to  be  imminent,  and  that  is 
the  failure  of  peace  talks.  I  don't  know  exactly  what  the  latest  word 
is  out  of  Sarajevo,  but  it  appears  as  if  they  are  going  to  reject,  or 
at  least  put  conditions  on  acceptance,  which  would  amount  to  rejec- 
tion of  the  negotiated  proposal.  What  are  the  consequences  of  that? 
What  flows  from  that  if  there  is  a  rejection? 

Mr.  Lampe.  I  will  start  by  suggesting  that  I  think  there  will  be 
further  negotiations  and  that  the 

Chairman  Hamilton.  It  is  not  a  final  rejection? 

Mr.  Lampe.  It  is  not  a  final  rejection  in  that,  if  the  most  recent 
account  I  have  seen  is  correct,  suggesting  that  the  Bosnian  govern- 
ment demands  are  centered  around  six  or  seven  urban  centers. 
Those  are  very  legitimate  demands.  They  do  not  involve  a  huge 
shift  in  the  percentage  of  territory,  so  it  is  conceivable  there  could 
be  one  more  "once"  as  the  winter  approaches. 

Mr.  Glenny.  I  was  in  Sarajevo  10  days  ago,  and  according  to  my 
sources  inside  the  Bosnian  government,  what  they  are  saying  the 
delay  is  about  is  due  to  the  fact  that  President  Izetbegovic  is  hav- 
ing to  bring  on  board  radicals  in  the  Muslim  leadership,  that  is 
radicals  from  Zenica  and  in  the  army,  to  try  and  persuade  them  to 
accept  this  peace  deal.  These  radicals  are  threatening  President 
Izetbegovic  with  reprisals  if  he  does  agree  to  it,  and  this  sort  of 
process  of  near  acceptance  and  then  rejection,  this  is  what  sources 
in  the  Bosnian  government  are  saying  is  in  order  to  bring  on  board 
those  hardliners  to  agree  to  this  deal,  and  this  is  why  we  are  see- 
ing such  a  troublesome  process. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  You  think  they  will  agree  to  it? 

Mr.  Glenny.  My  feeling  is  that  they  will  agree  to  this,  yes.  If 
they  don't  agree  to  it,  then  we  are  going  to  have  a  dreadful  winter 
in  Bosnia-Hercegovina  and  we  are  also  going  to  see  an  increased 
likelihood  of  the  outbreak  of  war  in  Croatia  again. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Ambassador  Kirkpatrick. 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick.  Yes,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  believe  that  what  will 
happen,  and  I  think  it  will  happen,  that  the  so-called  peace  nego- 
tiations will  fail,  and  what  it  will  mean  is  the  removal,  for  the 
present  at  least,  of  the  fig  leaf  of  pretense  that  peacekeeping  could 
be  based  on  consent  of  the  parties. 

I  think  this  absence  of  consent,  which  is  crucial  to  peacekeeping, 
is  what  should  inform  us  clearly  that  this  is  not  an  appropriate  sit- 
uation for  peacekeeping.  It  is  inappropriate.  It  is  a  desperate  hu- 
manitarian crisis  which  cannot  be  dealt  with  through  conventional 
peacekeeping  means. 


11 

I  believe  also,  as  I  understand  it,  the  Croatians  are  about  to  re- 
ject the  UNPROFOR  troops  for  next  year  and  will  in  the  process, 
of  course,  withdraw  consent  for  U.N.  operations  in  Croatia  as  well 
as  in  Bosnia. 

Mr.  Lampe.  That  is  right.  Yes. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  OK.  And  you  would  look  upon  a  rejection, 
Ambassador  Kirkpatrick,  as  a  desirable  development? 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick.  No,  I  don't  look  on  it  as  desirable.  Nothing 
that  has  happened  in  Bosnia  and  Croatia  is  desirable. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Nothing  is  desirable? 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick.  Just  nothing,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Let  me  ask  another  question,  then  I  will 
turn  to  Mr.  Gilman. 

AMERICAN  NATIONAL  INTERESTS 

How  would  you  express  the  American  national  interests  that  are 
at  stake  in  the  conflict  in  Yugoslavia?  Is  it  a  vital  interest  of  the 
United  States?  However  you  want  to  approach  it.  What  is  the 
American  national  interest  in  this  conflict? 

Mr.  Glenny.  I  will  talk  very  briefly,  from  the  European  point  of 
view,  on  what  I  believe  the  interests  of  the  United  States  are  in 
Europe.  The  United  States,  of  course,  has  already  deployed  300 
troops  inside  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,  and  I  be- 
lieve that  is  an  expression  of  American  interest  in  the  south  of  the 
Balkans. 

America  is  clearly  concerned  with  the  region  around  Turkey  be- 
cause of  Turkey's  central  position  both  bordering  on  Iran,  the 
southern  rim  of  the  former  Soviet  Union,  the  Middle  East,  Iraq, 
and  so  on,  and  also  the  southern  Balkans.  So  there  does  appear  to 
be,  as  far  as  I  can  observe,  an  active  interest  in  the  region  by  the 
United  States. 

The  other  important  interest  of  the  United  States,  as  far  as  I  un- 
derstand it,  in  this  region  is  that  a  destabilization  of  Southern  Eu- 
rope, possibly  Central  Europe  as  well,  is  going  to  have  severe  con- 
sequences for  the  existing  world  order  such  as  it  functions. 

Any  major  destabilization  of  Europe,  which  is  what  the  war  in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina  threatens,  also  threatens  the  vital  economic 
and  political  interests  of  the  United  States,  and  that  is  why,  al- 
though it  is  extremely  unfortunate  for  the  United  States,  it  has  to 
maintain  and  retain  its  security  role  inside  Europe. 

Mr.  Lampe.  Let  me  second  Misha  Glenny's  mention  of  the  eco- 
nomic aspect.  All  of  the  surrounding  countries,  including  Hungary, 
are  losing  hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars.  The  loss  has  been  esti- 
mated, in  fact,  for  Bulgaria  at  $2  billion  so  far.  Macedonia's  sur- 
vival as  a  separate  entity  is  threatened  with  tremendous  losses 
from  the  continuing  sanctions. 

And,  I  venture  to  say,  that  the  German  and  Austrian  economic 
performance  within  the  last  year  is  slowed  in  part  by  the  blockage 
of  normal  trade  to  the  South,  and  this  is  to  say  nothing  of  the  refu- 
gee crisis  that  also  snowballs  from  this. 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  believe  that  the  whole  history 
of  the  world,  and  certainly  of  this  century,  demonstrates  that  vio- 
lence is  contagious,  terribly  contagious,  and  that  is  the  whole  rea- 
son that  we  have  institutions  to  enforce  laws.  And  that  violence — 


12 

particularly  the  extreme  violence  that  characterizes  this  conflict 
which  results  in  successful  aggression,  rewards  for  aggression — will 
almost  certainly  be  repeated,  and  that  is  dangerous  for  us. 

Mr.  Lampe.  Hear!  Hear! 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Mr.  Gilman. 

Mr.  Gilman.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Again,  I  welcome  our  panelists,  thank  them  for  their  observa- 
tions. I  would  like  to  address  Ms.  Kirkpatrick. 

ARMING  OF  BOSNIAN  GOVERNMENT 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick,  you  signed  an  open  letter  to  President  Clinton 
advocating  that  our  Nation  and  other  Western  democracies  join  the 
government  of  Bosnia  under  Article  51  of  the  U.N.  charter  in  col- 
lective self-defense,  and  that  would  involve  the  use  of  Western  air- 
power  against  Serbian  military  targets,  in  essence,  and  arming  the 
Bosnian  government. 

Now  that  we  have  heard  about  this  proposed  agreement  for 
Bosnia,  do  you  still  believe  that  your  suggestion  to  trie  President 
is  preferable  to  the  prospect  of  25,000  American  troops  on  the 
ground  in  Bosnia? 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick.  Congressman  Gilman,  I  very  definitely  believe 
that  it  is  preferable,  and  I  believe  it  will  be  more  effective  in  bring- 
ing peace  on  some  kind  of  terms  compatible  with  survival  to 
Bosnia. 

I  just  don't  think  that  the  proposal  for  50,000  peacekeeping 
troops  will  work.  I  think  it  will  be  costly  and  expensive,  uncontrol- 
lable and  ineffective,  finally. 

I  think  the  Serbians  have  indicated  throughout  this  conflict  that 
they  understand  very  well  the  language  of  violence  themselves, 
which  is  their  native  language,  ana  that  the  Bosnians  who  have 
been  penalized  by  an  arms  embargo  that  unfairly  worked  against 
them  from  the  beginning  have  demonstrated  also  that  they  can 
make  use  of  arms  to  level  the  playing  field,  as  people  put  it. 

I  think  that  Article  51  of  the  U.N.  charter  makes  clear  that  the 
right  of  self-defense  and  collective  self-defense  is  available  to  all 
countries  who  are  subject  to  aggression. 

Clearly  the  Security  Council  has  not  dealt  with  this  problem. 
Base  this  on  international  law  and  I  think  strategy  would  be 
sound. 

HISTORY  OF  YUGOSLAV  PROBLEM 

Mr.  Gilman.  An  interesting  footnote  to  history,  the  other  day  I 
met  with  some  Austrian  diplomats  who  reminded  me  that  during 
the  Austro-Hungarian  empire  in  1878,  I  believe  it  was,  they  too 
were  confronted  with  the  Yugoslavian,  Bosnia-Hercegovina  prob- 
lem, sent  in  some  50,000  troops  initially  and  they  found  that  wasn't 
sufficient.  Sent  another  50,000  in  thereafter,  found  that  wasn't  suf- 
ficient. Same  problems  existed  then  as  exist  now. 

So  I  think  we  better  take  a  good  look  at  our  history  books  as  we 
confront  this  problem. 

Mr.  Lampe.  Congressman,  could  I 

Mr.  Gilman.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lampe.  As  a  historian,  could  I  add  a  footnote  here  from 
1878? 


13 

Mr.  Gilman.  Yes,  Mr.  Lampe. 

Mr.  Lampe.  That  was  an  occasion  for  the  Austro-Hungarian  em- 
pire to  occupy  all  of  Bosnia-Hercegovina,  taking  it  over  from  an 
Ottoman  empire  that  was  essentially  obliged  to  cede  it.  So  I  don't 
think  that  is  a  comparable  historical  exchange. 

It  was,  however,  a  time  when  the  various  ethnic  groups  in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina  tended  to  be,  although  led  by  the  Muslims,  to- 
gether in  opposing  the  foreign  presence. 

Mr.  Gilman.  They  had  related  to  me  that  it  was  somewhat  simi- 
lar circumstances.  I  thank  you  for  further  elaborating  on  that. 

SAFE  HAVENS 

Mr.  Glenny,  you  have  written  that,  in  your  view,  the  best  among 
a  series  of  undesirable  options  is  to  implement  the  safe  havens 
plan  on  behalf  Bosnia's  Muslim  community.  I  assume  you  feel  that 
the  present  peace  plan  with  NATO  providing  the  security  carries 
forward  the  safe  havens  concept. 

You  base  your  prescription  on  the  belief  that  nothing  other  than 
the  interposition  of  superior  forces  will  prevent  the  ethnic  hos- 
tilities among  the  Serbs,  the  Croats  and  Muslim  communities  from 
continuing. 

How  long  do  you  expect  that  the  NATO  deployment  would  have 
to  last  to  guarantee  that  peace  lasts  in  Bosnia?  This  is  something 
that  is  troubling  all  of  us.  How  long  would  we  have  to  be  there? 

Mr.  Glenny.  I  would  say  that  it  is  very  difficult  to  put  any  pre- 
cise timing  on — any  length  of  stay  on  the  NATO  troops.  But  in  the 
first  instance,  I  would  say  there  should  be  a  commitment  of  at  least 
3  years  of  these  troops  going  in  there. 

What  has  happened  since  before  June  1991  when  the  war  broke 
out  in  the  former  Yugoslavia  is  that  the  international  community 
has  been  extremely  divided  in  its  approach  to  the  Yugoslav  crisis. 
And  we  must  now  unite  in  our  approach.  We  can  only  unite  in  our 
approach  to  a  solution,  not  merely  of  the  question  of  Bosnia- 
Hercegovina,  but  of  Croatia,  FYRM — that  is  the  Former  Yugoslav 
Republic  of  Macedonia — and  Kosovo,  and  so  on  and  so  forth.  And 
we  need  at  least  3  years,  I  would  say,  in  order  to  do  this. 

Mr.  Gilman.  I  thank  you.  I  thank  the  panelists. 

This  is  a  troublesome  issue  for  all  of  us  as  we  confront  whether 
to  commit  25,000  troops  to  that  area. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Mr.  Torricelli. 

Mr.  Torricelli.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

FUTURE  PROBLEMS  IN  EUROPE 

Ambassador  Kirkpatrick,  reflecting  upon  this  crisis  that  has  un- 
folded in  these  months,  what  does  it  reveal  for  us  about  European 
institutions  and  how  the  United  States  should  approach  future 
problems  in  Europe,  the  extent  to  which  we  should  be — can  afford 
to  be — deferential,  the  extent  to  which  Europe  may  have  learned 
from  the  failure  of  institutions  in  this  instance,  what  it  tells  us 
about  how  we  approach  future  American  policy  on  the  continent? 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick.  Congressman  Torricelli,  I  believe  that  the  pas- 
sivity of  the  world  in  the  face  of  genocide — I  think  it  is  genocide — 
in  Bosnia  demonstrates  the  first  major  failure  of  the  West  since  the 


73-703  0-93-2 


14 

cold  war — since  World  War  II  really.  It  certainly  represents  the 
first  major  failure  of  the  EC.  In  the  first  instance,  the  EC  claimed 
jurisdiction  over  the  exploding  violence  in  what  was  Yugoslavia  and 
the  EC  quite  simply  has  talked  at  great  length  and  ended  with  a 
solution  that  resembles  that  of  the  Avignon  conference  before 
World  War  II. 

I  think  that  the  EC  has  proved  inept  and  incapable  of  taking  se- 
riously the  need  for  effective  collective  security  on  its  own  borders 
in  the  heart  of  Europe,  and  I  am  sure  that  must  be  a  great  dis- 
appointment to  most  opponents  of  European  unity  and  it  should  be 
a  great  disappointment  to  the  governments  of  Europe. 

I  find  the  tendency  to  repeat  appeasement  and  to  respond  with 
passivity  to  so  much  violence  on  their  borders  almost  incredible  on 
the  part  of  our  closest  friends  and  allies,  in  Europe,  quite  frankly. 

Mr.  Torricelli.  There  clearly  was  a  judgment  in  this  govern- 
ment to  be  deferential  to  Europe  generally  and  the  Germans  spe- 
cifically when  indeed  the  Yugoslav  Federation  began  to  break.  If, 
in  the  future  from  the  Bosphorus  to  the  Basques,  there  is  another 
European  crisis  that  evolves  into  violence  and  threatens  a  state,  I 
trust  that  until  precedent  is  otherwise  established  it  should  be  our 
judgment  that  the  EC,  the  Western  European  union  and  such  other 
institutions  as  exist  in  Western  Europe  simply  cannot  be  believed 
to  be  sufficient  to  deal  with  these  crises  while  the  United  States 
waits  and  hopes  for  the  best. 

Would  that  be  your  assessment? 

Ms.  Kerkpatrick.  That  would  be  my  assessment,  yes. 

Mr.  Torricelli.  Would  anyone  else  like  to  comment  on  this? 

Mr.  Lampe.  Well,  I  would  like  to  add  therefore  that  does  this  not 
bring  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Alliance  back  into  the  center  of 
American  attention?  This  is  one  institution  that  did  work  well  in 
its  time.  Its  purpose  now  is  questioned  more  generally. 

And  so  it  seems  to  me  that  the  European  failure  combined  with 
the  existence  of  this  American-led  longstanding  alliance  does  bring 
the  issue  of  NATO  responsibility  before  us. 

Mr.  Torricelli.  For  some  of  us  it  never  left  the  center  of  atten- 
tion. 

Mr.  Lampe.  Yes. 

Mr.  Torricelli.  That  is  part  of  the  point  I  was  trying  to  make. 

ACCESS  TO  ADRIATIC 

The  Bosnian  insistence  on  an  access  to  the  Adriatic  being  critical 
for  the  economic  vitality  of  the  state  and,  indeed,  for  its  security. 
Would  each  of  you  comment  upon  whether,  given  the  cost  of  achiev- 
ing this  outlet,  the  delay  in  a  peace  settlement,  the  chance  of  re- 
newed conflict,  whether  indeed  this  is  worth  the  price  and  their  se- 
curity and  economic  assessment  has  merit? 

Mr.  Gutman.  Congressman,  it  has  basically  been  accepted  by 
both  sides,  as  I  understand  it.  There  is  a  signed  agreement  about 
10  days  or  2  weeks  old;  I  think  it  functions  largely  in  a  psycho- 
logical aspect.  Clearly  a  landlocked  Bosnia  right  now  is  suffering 
greatly.  It  cannot  survive.  They  must  have  access  to  the  sea. 

And  my  understanding  is,  as  I  say,  that  basically  it  has  been 
agreed  to  in  a  form  that  is  acceptable  to  the  Bosnians. 


15 

Mr.  TORRICELLI.  I  thought  that  the  corridor  to  it  was  judged  not 
to  be  sufficient,  not  have  security.  That  it  was  too  narrow  or  did 
not  provide  enough  of  an  access.  Is  that  not  accurate? 

Mr.  Gutman.  Corridors  are  a  very  uncertain  and  historically 
weak  way  of  solving  any  kind  of  problem,  and  the  idea  of  creating 
this  whole  string  of  corridors  which  have  to  be  patrolled  and  sup- 
ported by  outside  forces  is  a  very  uncertain  thing.  It  is  really  risky, 
and  I  don't  know  how  many  troops  it  would  take  to  actually  make 
sure  that  these  corridors  would  remain  open. 

It  is  clearly  no  substitute  for  what  now  exists. 

Mr.  Glenny.  Bosnian  Foreign  Minister  Haris  Silajdzic  has  ex- 
pressed satisfaction  with  the  agreement  reached  in  Zagreb  with 
Mate  Granic,  who  is  the  Croat  Foreign  Minister,  as  regards  the  ac- 
cess to  the  sea. 

SITUATION  INSIDE  EUROPE 

I  would  like  very  briefly  to  come  back  to  your  last  question  about 
the  situation  inside  Europe.  We  are  constrained  by  certain  histori- 
cal conditions.  For  example,  we  cannot  deploy  German  troops  any- 
where inside  of  Eastern  Europe  at  all.  It  simply  cannot  happen. 

We  are  also  constrained  by  historical  conflicts  between  the  var- 
ious nations  of  Europe.  As  such,  we  are  simply  not  in  a  constitu- 
tional position  to  move  toward  a  swift  type  of  unity  which  would 
guarantee  the  security  of  Europe  without  the  United  States  there. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  I  might  say  to  members  that  according  to 
rules  of  the  committee,  I  will  call  on  those  members  who  were  here 
at  the  start  of  the  meeting,  and  the  order  from  this  point  will  be 
Mr.  Hyde,  Mr.  Menendez,  Mr.  McCloskey,  and  then  we  will  go  to 
members  who  came  in  after  the  meeting  started. 

Mr.  Hyde. 

Mr.  Hyde.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Let  me  just  preface  my  remarks  by  thanking  you  for  holding 
these  hearings.  I  think  these  are  very  important.  I  think  the  Amer- 
ican people  had  better  start  focusing  on  this  situation,  and  Con- 
gress had  better  start  getting  interested  in  it  as  well. 

Before  I  ask  a  question  I  just  cannot  help  but  comment  on  the 
intractability  of  what  confronts  us.  It  seems  to  me  that  this  is  Ab- 
yssinia 1935  again.  The  world  stands  around  and  fulminates  but 
is  immensely  passive  in  the  face  of  an  international  outrage. 

And  it  would  appear,  depressingly  so,  that  the  term  "collective 
security"  is  still  an  illusion  and  the  world  has  learned  nothing  from 
the  great  wars  that  we  have  been  confronted  with.  Santayana  is 
going  to  be  vindicated  again. 

Ethnic  disputes  elsewhere  are  watching  and  they  are  going  to  see 
there  is  no  penalty  for  aggression,  and  this  can  proliferate. 

Article  51  must  be  a  dead  letter  because  nobody  pays  any  atten- 
tion to  it.  A  sovereign  state  cries  out  for  help  and  we  avert  our 
eyes,  and  the  world  averts  our  eyes  and  reinforces  embargoes  that 
are  lopsided,  and  it  is  just  very  depressing. 

This  committee  did  pass  an  amendment  which  gave  the  Presi- 
dent the  authority  to,  and  hopefully  the  incentive  to,  lift  the  embar- 
go, insofar  as  this  country  is  concerned,  pursuant  to  Article  51  to 
permit  the  Bosnians  to  defend  themselves.  But  that  language  is 


16 

over  in  the  other  body  and  I  am  grateful  that  Ms.  Kirkpatrick 
averted  to  it. 

Now,  given  our  predisposition  to  support  the  Bosnian  govern- 
ment, can  we  or  should  we  play  an  impartial  role  in  enforcing  a 
peace  agreement  as  though  both  sides  or  equally  innocent  or 
guilty? 

This  is  a  peace  agreement  that  is  a  disaster,  that  is  a  rape  of  an 
entire  country,  a  sovereign  country,  and  I  am  wondering  if  our  role 
should  be  to  try  to  enforce  that  which  is  not  based  on  the  consent 
certainly  of  the  victims,  the  Bosnians,  the  Muslims,  or  should  we 
protect  the  Muslim  enclaves  and  perhaps  even  lift  the  arms  embar- 
go, and  arm  them  so  they  might  defend  themselves. 

U.S.  ROLE 

Mr.  Glenny  has  given  a  powerful  argument  against  that.  I  would 
be  interested  to  know  what  the  rest  of  the  panel — not  that  I  am 
disinterested  in  your  views,  but  I  know  them.  They  are  very  vigor- 
ously asserted  and  a  little  scary,  I  might  add.  But  could  I  hear 
from  Mr.  Gutman  and  Professor  Lampe,  and  certainly  Ms.  Kirk- 
patrick, on  whether  we  should  be  over  there  enforcing  a  dishonest, 
disreputable  proceeds  of  aggression  called  a  peace  agreement? 

Mr.  Gutman.  Congressman,  with  due  respect,  I  would  prefer  not 
to  offer  policy  prescriptions  or  even  advice,  because  I  am  still,  as 
a  reporter,  in  a  sense  covering  your  committee. 

But  I  would  say,  of  course,  that  there  are  great  difficulties  in  en- 
forcing the  agreement.  And,  in  my  statement,  I  have  alluded  to  the 
difficulty  I,  as  a  reporter,  have  in  even  understanding  what  the 
agreement  is  about. 

My  concern  is  what  has  happened  already  to  the  people  because 
I  think  that  that  is  the  event,  the  fact  that  will  probably  motivate 
them  in  the  future. 

Mr.  Hyde.  It  is  more  of  a  cease-fire  than  a  peace  agreement,  isn't 
it? 

WAR  CRIMES 

Mr.  Gutman.  Well,  sir,  as  I  say,  my  concern  is  that  so  much  has 
happened  already  that  you  must  take  into  account  the  motives  of 
the  people  who  have  suffered,  and  what  are  their  motives  are  for 
supporting  an  agreement.  This  is  really  a  critical  question.  In  the 
case  of  the  Serbs,  and  at  this  point  the  Croats  and,  of  course,  ev- 
erybody is  involved  in  the  atrocities  to  some  degree,  but  especially 
the  Serbs  and  Croats,  you  have  on  the  one  side  many  people  who 
can  be  accused  of  war  crimes,  and  then  you  have  many  victims  of 
war  crimes.  Those  who  have  committed  the  crimes  have  some  stake 
in  not  being  caught,  and,  in  fact,  perhaps  even  carrying  out  more, 
if  necessary,  whereas  those  who  are  victims  have  a  stake  in  re- 
venge. You  have  to  deal  with  the  basic  question  of  justice,  I  think 
if  you  are  going  to  figure  out  how  to  put  Bosnia  together,  how  to 
even  stabilize  the  region. 

LIFTING  ARMS  EMBARGO 

Mr.  Lampe.  Congressman,  let  me  speak  against  lifting  the  arms 
embargo,  not  from  any  great  enthusiasm  for  the  idea  of  equal  re- 


17 

sponsibility.  I  don't  advance  that  proposition.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  this  kind  of  fighting,  this  kind  of  killing,  has  generated  the 
feeling  on  all  sides  that  we  are  wronged  unjustly.  We  must  take 
revenge.  Also,  all  sides  have  individuals  who  want  to  avoid  pros- 
ecution. The  continuation  of  fighting  lets  those  elements  come  for- 
ward. We  see  them  advancing  in  some  of  the  Bosnian  Muslim  lead- 
ership now. 

Mr.  Hyde.  But,  Professor,  you  would  lift  the  sanctions  on  Croatia 
and  Serbia  and  keep  the  embargo  imposed  on  the  Bosnians? 

Mr.  Lampe.  Only  food  and  medicine,  to  take  away  the  easy  sup- 
port that  it  gives  to  the  Milosevic  regime.  We  don't  have  sanctions 
on  Croatia  at  this  time. 

At  the  same  time,  if  the  fighting  were  stopped  and  these  military 
forces  mixed  in  with  the  gangster  and  criminal  elements  that  are 
coming  forward  on  all  sides  were  stopped — and  I  think  they  are 
frightened  enough  of  NATO  forces  in  general  and  American  forces 
in  particular — that  is  the  only  chance  we  have  got  to  have  some 
kind  of  reasonable  exchange  and  a  settlement  come  forward. 

I  would  agree  with  you  that  this  is  somewhere  between  a  cease- 
fire and  a  settlement.  I  think  we  will  never  get  a  settlement  with- 
out the  intimidation  of  the  NATO  forces  on  the  ground. 

U.N.  CHARTER  ON  BORDERS 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick.  Congressman  Hyde,  I  would  like  to  say  that  I 
believe  that  it  is  unacceptable  to  the  consciences  of  many  Ameri- 
cans to  use  American  forces  and  resources  to  enforce  the  borders 
of  the  new  Bosnia.  We  know  how  those  borders  came  to  be.  We 
know  that  there  has  been  here  a  violation  of  the  most  basic  rule 
of  the  U.N.  charter. 

The  U.N.  charter  does  not  recommend  neutrality  in  the  face  of 
aggression.  The  U.N.  charter  does  not  speak  about  neutrality  or 
even  about  peacekeeping.  The  U.N.  charter  asserts  that  aggression 
is  forbidden,  that  the  threat  or  use  of  force  against  the  territorial 
integrity  or  political  independence  of  any  state  is  in  fact  a  violation 
of  the  charter — the  most  fundamental  violation  of  the  charter.  And 
it  recommends  that  acts  be  taken  to  restore  the  damage  wrought 
by  the  use  of  force  in  violating  the  borders  of  a  sovereign  state. 

Bosnia  is  a  sovereign  state.  Its  borders  have  been  violated  by 
acts  of  aggression  and  the  use  of  force.  To  treat,  to  respond  to,  that 
aggression  with  neutrality  is  to  make  a  mockery  of  the  U.N.  char- 
ter, and  of  international  law,  in  fact,  and  of  our  commitment  to  law 
and  to  peace. 

Thank  you. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Yes,  Mr.  Glenny? 

Mr.  Glenny.  May  I  make  a  brief  remark  seeing  as  Congressman 
Hyde  addressed  me  on  this? 

I  wanted  to  refute  one  very  important  myth  about  the  cause  of 
this  war,  and  that  is  that  the  processes  associated  with  the  collapse 
of  the  former  Yugoslavia  are  identical  to  that  of  German  imperial 
expansion  in  the  1930's  through  the  Nazi  war  machine,  and  that 
what  has  happened  in  Sarajevo  is  a  close  analogy  with  what  hap- 
pened in  Munich,  because  Yugoslavia  was  an  existing  state.  In  that 
state  the  Serbs  of  Yugoslavia  had  certain  guarantees  which  they 


18 

had  demanded  because  of  the  genocide  perpetrated  against  them 
during  the  second  world  war. 

Now  this  state,  Yugoslavia,  was  derecognized  without  consulting 
the  Serbs  in  Croatia  and  in  Bosnia-Hercegovina  who  are  an  ex- 
tremely insecure  part  of  the  Serbian  nation.  They  were  also  ex- 
tremely well  armed. 

And  few  people  took  account  of  what  we  were  doing  by  encourag- 
ing the  independence  of  the  constituent  Republics  of  the  former 
Yugoslavia. 

When  I  argue  that  we  should  not  lift  the  arms  embargo,  I  do  it 
because  close  personal  friends  of  mine  have  been  killed  in  Sarajevo, 
Muslims.  I  do  not  want  to  see  more  close  personal  friends  of  mine 
killed  in  Skopje  or  killed  in  Pristina,  Albanians  and  Macedonians. 

That  is  why  I  argue  not  to  lift  the  arms  embargo,  and  that  argu- 
ment is  a  reflection  of  many,  many  independent  Muslim  intellec- 
tuals inside  Sarajevo,  Zagreb,  and  elsewhere  in  the  former  Yugo- 
slavia. It  is  not  essentially  a  Serb  or  Croat  argument. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Mr.  Berman. 

Mr.  Berman.  Well,  just  following  up  on  Mr.  Hyde's  question— al- 
though maybe  before  I  ask  my  question,  I  saw  Ambassador  Kirk- 
patrick  shaking  her  head  negatively  toward  Mr.  GlennVs  com- 
ments. Did  you  want  to  reject  nis  analysis  of  the  sense  of  the  ori- 
gins of  this  problem? 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick.  Yes,  I  did.  Thank  you.  I  wanted  to  suggest 
that  there  was  an  opportunity,  in  fact,  for  Serbs  in  Bosnia  and  Cro- 
atia to  participate  in  the  national  referendum  which  was  held 
under  conditions  of  democratic  competition  and  which  they  decided 
to  boycott.  That  was  their  decision,  but  they  had  the  opportunity 
to  participate. 

And  I  would  also  like  to  suggest  that  both  of  those  states  were 
recognized  by  the  EC,  by  the  United  Nations,  and  that  if  we  are 
to  argue  that  states,  some  minority  of  which  deny  the  legitimacy 
of  the  process  of  self-determination  and  the  declaration  of  inde- 
pendence, should  become  the  objects  of  aggression,  therefore  that 
applies  to  the  whole  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  among  other 
places.  The  precedent  is  a  dangerous  one. 

LIFTING  OF  ARMS  EMBARGO 

Mr.  Berman.  My  question:  we,  in  Congress,  can't  make  the  deci- 
sion to  lift  the  embargo.  There  is  a  separate  question  of  whether 
the  President  is  legally  able  to  do  it  given  that  there  is  a  Security- 
Council-imposed  embargo.  And  Mr.  Hyde  has  an  argument  with 
that.  I  voted  with  him  to  urge  the  President  to  do  whatever  he  can 
legally  to  lift  it. 

authorization  of  peacekeeping  forces 

But  let's  assume  we  are  unsuccessful  in  affecting  the  administra- 
tion's decision.  What  are  the  moral  implications  now  of  authorizing 
peacekeeping  forces  which  hold  out  the  promise  of  limiting  further 
aggression  against  Bosnia  and  leaving  it  with  far  less  than  it 
should  have  territorially,  but  will  alleviate  the  killing  and  the 
fighting,  versus  not  authorizing  those  forces  which  would  mean  a 
winter  of  interrupted  humanitarian  supplies,  further  fighting,  more 
ethnic  cleansing,  and  who  knows  what? 


19 

And  in  that  context  isn't  Professor  Lampe's  comment  about  Am- 
bassador Kirkpatrick's  analogy  to  Munich  and  Sudetenland  correct? 
No  one  came  in  then  to  limit  the  unjust  occupation  of  that  portion 
of  Czechoslovakia  with  peacekeeping  forces  that  had  the  right  to 
stand  up  and  resist  further  Nazi  aggression.  Is  that  a  question  that 
is  possible  to  parse  and  figure  out  what  I 

ETHNIC  CLEANSING 

Mr.  Gutman.  Congressman,  may  I  make  one  comment  regarding 
ethnic  cleansing? 

Ethnic  cleansing  has  continued  throughout  the  entire  period  of 
the  peace  process.  The  peace  process  has  done  nothing  to  curb  it. 
It  continues  today,  and  the  estimate  of  the  international  relief 
agencies  who  are  on  the  ground  is  that  this  agreement  does  not 
really  protect  the  minorities  in  the  various  places  they  are 

Mr.  Berman.  And  the  peacekeeping  forces  would  have  no  ability 
to  deal  with  that? 

Mr.  Gutman.  I  am  honestly  not  sure. 

Mr.  Lampe.  We  are  not  sure. 

Mr.  Gutman.  Because  the  negotiators  and  their  spokesmen  can- 
not say  whether  the  forces  are  going  to  do  anything  to  protect  the 
minorities.  But  I  will  say  that  the  expectation  is  that  ethnic  cleans- 
ing will  probably  speed — this  is  by  the  relief  agencies — will  speed 
up,  and  it  is  a  consequence  of  the  agreement. 

In  other  words,  if  you  set  up  ethnically  pure  statelets  or  mini- 
states  and  they  are  ethnically  based,  what  will  happen  is  that 
there  will  be  an  expulsion  almost  automatically  of  the  other  nation- 
alities from  those  mini-states. 

PEACEKEEPING  APPROACH 

Ms.  KiRKPATRlCK.  That  is  a  very  important  reason  for  my  feeling, 
my  conviction,  that  the  peacekeeping  approach  in  fact  will  not 
achieve  virtually  any  of  the  goals  which  we  might  set  for  it,  be- 
cause the  peacekeeping  forces  have  been  present.  Unlike  Czecho- 
slovakia, they  have  been  present.  But  like  Czechoslovakia,  nothing 
good  has  happened  as  a  consequence  of  it.  Peacekeeping  forces  did 
not  prevent  ethnic  cleansing.  They  did  not  prevent  starvation.  They 
did  not  lift  sieges.  You  know,  the  fact  is  that  President  Clinton's 
decision  to  airlift  thousands  of  tons  of  food  and  medicine  has  done 
more  for  towns,  civilian  populations  under  siege,  in  fact,  than 
UNPROFOR  forces,  which  is  the  reason  that  most  Bosnians  and 
Croatians  are  deeply  tempted  to  ask  for  the  withdrawal  of 
UNPROFOR  forces. 

Mr.  Lampe.  Well,  the  failure,  I  would  argue,  of  the  UNPROFOR, 
is  passive  rules  of  engagements  and  small  contingents,  that  to  me 
is  simply  an  argument  for  the  larger  actively  engaged  force. 

And,  Congressman,  I  think  there  is  room  in  this  further  round 
of  bargaining  that  is  coming  now  to  push  for  the  kind  of  explicit 
guarantees  for  minorities  that  actually  were  in  and  should  have 
been  strongly  placed  into  the  original  Vance-Owen  plan. 

I  wonder  Misha  Glenny  has  any  sense  of  whether  the  various 
sides  would  respond  to  any  bargaining  on  that  score  for  minority 
guarantees. 


20 

Mr.  Glenny.  No,  I  am  afraid  they  wouldn't.  You  know,  this 
agreement,  as  I  said  earlier  on,  is  deeply  flawed  and  it  does — now, 
this  agreement,  it  does  legitimize  ethnic  cleansing. 

I  might  add  that  the  bulk  of  ethnic  cleansing  going  on  at  the  mo- 
ment is  between  Muslims  and  Croats,  and  it  is  not  between  Serbs 
and  Muslims  so  much  now.  Once  we  recognize 

Mr.  Berman.  Mr.  Gutman  disagrees  with  you. 

Mr.  Gutman.  Sure.  In  my  statement  I  have  included  a  list  of  four 
or  five  examples  of  ethnic  cleansing  that  is  going  on  in  the  Serb 
territories  as  well. 

Mr.  Glenny.  Yes.  But  the  bulk  of  cleansing  at  the  moment  is 
going  on  in  Mostar.  The  bulk  of  cleansing  is  going  on  in  Vitez,  in 
Bugojno,  and  so  on  and  so  forth.  I  mean  it  has  been  done  by  the 
Serbs 

Mr.  Berman.  By  both  Croatian  and  Bosnian  forces? 

Mr.  Glenny.  By  both  Croatian  and  Bosnian,  that  is,  largely  Mus- 
lim forces.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is  once  we  recognize  Croatia  with- 
out getting  the  prior  agreement  of  the  Serbian  minority  in  Croatia, 
then  Bosnia-Hercegovina  is  finished.  It  is  a  victim  of  regional  impe- 
rialism, that  is,  Serbian  and  Croatian  imperialism. 

And  we  created  that  situation  by  allowing  the  Germans  to  go 
ahead  and  recognize  Croatia  when  the  Serbs  were  saying  we  will 
kill  everybody  if  you  go  ahead  and  do  this.  Until  that  time,  20,000 
people  had  been  killed.  Once  Croatia  was  recognized,  the  increase 
in  the  number  of  deaths  in  Bosnia-Hercegovina  was  tenfold,  up  to 
200,000.  That  was  our  mistake.  Germany  has  to  live  with  it.  And 
I  am  afraid  everybody  else  that  followed  Germany's  role  has  to  live 
with  it  as  well.  That  is  the  responsibility. 

Mr.  Berman.  I  am  going  to  have  to  ask  for  a  recess  at  this  time 
so  I  can  go  vote.  I  see  everybody  else  has  just  about  left.  Unless, 
Mr.  Oberstar,  you  want  to  question  now  and  miss  the  vote? 

Oh,  OK.  Be  right  back. 

[Recess]. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  The  committee  will  resume  its  sitting, 
please. 

Mr.  Menendez. 

Mr.  Menendez.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  would  like  to  thank  the  panel,  as  my  other  colleagues  have. 

LACK  OF  EUROPEAN  WILL 

As  I  listened,  I  am  concerned  about  not  only  what  we  do  here  but 
where  we  go  in  the  future,  and  I  have  two  questions,  particularly. 
One  I  think  in  part  may  have  been  answered  earlier,  but  I  would 
like  to  hear  the  responses  of  others,  and  that  is  my  perception  of 
a  lack  of  European  will  in  this  process. 

You  know  it  has  been  said  that  what  is  past  is  prologue,  and  I 
am  looking  here  as  we  try  to  grapple  with  what  we  do  now — I 
think  there  were  opportunities  at  one  time  and  they  were  lost.  But 
what  we  do  now  is  one  question  which  is  very  important.  But  what 
lessons  do  we  get  from  this  for  the  future? 

And  so  my  two  questions  to  the  panel  are:  I  heard  Mr.  Glenny 
talk  about  historical  aspects.  I  don't  quite  know  that  I  can  accept 
those  as  a  simple  answer  to  the  lack  of  European  will  here  and  the 
question  of  its  will  for  the  future.  So  I  would  like  to  hear  from  the 


21 

panel:  what  do  you  think  its  will  will  be  in  this  case  as  we  proceed 
on  the  issues  and  what  will  it  be  in  the  future? 

And  secondly,  what  lessons  do  we,  the  United  States,  take  from 
this  as  we  look  toward  those  who  say  that  these  ethnic  wars  in  the 
former  Yugoslavia  are  just  unique  to  them,  which  I  don't  nec- 
essarily believe,  or  are  a  prototype  of  the  type  of  ethnic  crises  and 
conflicts  that  we  will  see  in  other  parts  of  the  world? 

And  if  they  are,  then  what  is  it  that  we  as  a  nation  should  be 
prepared  to  do  both  preemptively  as  we  see  various  tinderboxes  in 
different  places  ready  to  explode? 

And  I  offer  that  to  anyone  on  the  panel.  And  maybe  Ambassador 
Kirkpatrick  will  go  first. 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick.  Thank  you.  I  would  just  like  to  say  that  I  actu- 
ally don't  believe  that  the  conflict  in  what  was  formerly  Yugoslavia 
is  an  ethnic  conflict.  You  know,  I  think  if  it  were  an  ethnic  conflict 
based  on  historical  ethnic  differences,  then  we  would  see  the  same 
kind  of  conflict  in  relationship  to  the  separation  of  Czechoslovakia, 
for  example.  I  believe  that  it  is  a  problem  of  political  leadership 
above  all,  and  that  the  government  of  Serbia  under  the  leadership 
of  Milosevic  is,  in  fact,  expansionist  and  violent,  and  that  we  have 
one  more  example  of  the  danger  of  violent  expansionist  regimes. 

And  one  of  the  morals  of  the  story  is  to  just  work  harder  to  en- 
sure that  such  regimes  do  not  come  into  being  and  are  not  viable, 
and  to  in  fact  work  harder  for  the  establishment  of  democracies. 
That  is  not  quite  good  enough.  But  I  think  it's  important  to  be 
clear  about  the  importance  of  the  nature  of  the  regime  and  the 
quality  of  the  political  leadership. 

I  think  that  is  a  reason  that  there  has  not  been  violence  in  Rus- 
sia. Imagine  how  much  violence  there  could  have  been  in  relation- 
ship to  the  dismantling  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  establishment 
of  independent  states  around  the  borders  of  Russia.  But  there 
hasn't  been,  except  now  in  Georgia,  and  maybe  in  Azerbaijan  it  is 
beginning. 

I  believe,  though,  that  effective,  more  or  less  democratic  leader- 
ship was  able  to  prevent  that  developing,  and  I  just  think  it  is  use- 
ful to  be  clear  about  it. 

Mr.  Lampe.  Congressman,  if  I  could  endorse  your  imperative  to 
look  to  the  future.  I  would  however  note  that  in  the  case  of  the  eth- 
nic groups  in  the  former  Yugoslavia,  unlike  Czechoslovakia,  there 
is  the  memory  of  the  killing  in  World  War  II  partly  connected  with 
the  wider  events  of  World  War  II  and  partly  with  ethnic  animos- 
ities on  the  scene,  so  that  sons  or  even  some  of  the  participants 
from  that  strife  are  involved  again,  and  that  was  not  the  case  in 
Czechoslovakia. 

But  I  did  think  the  shock  of  this  has  had  some  value  in  Europe. 
I  think  that  many  leaders  in  Europe  are  looking  to  do  more,  and 
I  think  there  is  an  opening  for  American  leadership  here. 

What  we  can  do  about  better  political  leadership  in  the  former 
Yugoslavia?  I  would  agree  with  Ambassador  Kirkpatrick,  that  that 
has  been  a  huge  part  of  the  problem.  In  fact,  I  think  the  existing 
ethnic  animosities  would  not  have  come  forward  with  better  politi- 
cal leadership  from  the  various  Yugoslav  parts,  but  it  is  too  late 
now. 


22 

Mr.  Glenny.  I  would  just  like  to  say  on  this  question  that  I  be- 
lieve that  both  Europe  and  the  United  States  chronically  underesti- 
mated the  impact  of  the  collapse  of  communism  on  pan-European 
stability;  i.e.  stability  of  Western  Europe  and  Eastern  Europe. 

We  have  made  in  Europe  one  or  two  extremely  grave  mistakes 
in  our  response  to  the  Yugoslav  crisis.  In  defense  of  my  continental 
compatriots,  however,  we  have  also  made  a  substantial  effort  in 
terms  of  delivering  humanitarian  aid  to  Bosnia-Hercegovina  and 
for  maintaining  some  sort  of  peace  in  Croatia. 

We  have  got  well  over  15,000  troops — this  is  Europe  as  a  whole — 
stationed  in  Croatia  and  in  Bosnia-Hercegovina.  And  although  the 
United  States  has  made  a  fantastically  welcome  effort  in  terms  of 
supplying  food  by  air  to  the  Muslim  enclaves  in  the  Gorazde,  in 
Mostar  and  elsewhere,  that  the  capital,  Sarajevo,  and  several  other 
towns  in  Bosnia-Hercegovina  have  survived  over  the  past  year  ex- 
clusively by  dint  of  the  UNPROFOR  operation  in  Bosnia- 
Hercegovina,  which  is  peopled  largely  by  Europeans. 

Mr.  Menendez.  Hopefully,  we  have  had  a  wake-up  call  on  both 
sides  of  the  continent.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  OK.  The  last  of  the  members  who  were 
here  at  the  start  of  the  meeting  is  Mr.  McCloskey.  He  will  be  fol- 
lowed by  Mr.  Roth. 

Mr.  McCloskey. 

Mr.  McCloskey.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Chairman. 

CONCENTRATION  CAMPS 

I  commend  you  for  putting  together  this  invaluable  and  gifted 
panel.  I  want  to  particularly  welcome  Roy  Gutman.  His  contribu- 
tion, Mr.  Chairman,  to  the  cause  of  humanity  has  been  invaluable. 
He  was  the  first  to  reveal  that  concentration  camps,  which,  by  the 
way,  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  still  exist. 

As  his  book  shows,  in  spite  of  all  the  intelligence  sources  avail- 
able to  Western  governments,  somehow  word  about  the  camps  was 
not  getting  out. 

In  addition,  it  is  of  historical  importance  that  Ambassador  Kirk- 
patrick  put  on  the  record  her  analysis  of  not  only  the  tragedy  and 
the  fall  of  Yugoslavia,  but  also  of  what  is  now  at  stake  for  us  in 
the  region.  This  will  help  all  of  us  to  decide  whether  to  deploy  so- 
called  peacekeeping  troops  in  a  really  immoral,  dysfunctional,  im- 
possible situation. 

Even  though  they  will  be  in  a  passive  or  nonaggressive  role,  our 
troops  will,  in  effect,  wind  up  in  the  crossfire  between  Muslims, 
Serbs  and  Croats.  The  effect  of  their  presence  would  really  be  to 
ratify  Serb  gains.  I  don't  see  how  that  can  work. 

Ambassador,  I  want  to  commend  you  for  your  opening  statement. 
I  think  it  is  right  on  point  and  should  be  widely  disseminated. 

I  found  your  comment  about  a  "fig  leaf  to  be  very  appropriate 
if  the  Bosnian  government  accepted  the  Owen-Milosevic  Plan,  they 
would  not  do  so  willingly.  I  said  last  week  that  such  an  acceptance 
would  come  from  a  gun  to  Bosnian  President  Izetbegovic's  head, 
but  that  is  not  quite  accurate.  It  is  really  a  gun  to  the  collective 
heads  of  all  his  people. 


23 

So  he  is  obviously  in  an  impossible  situation.  He  almost  has  to 
say  yes.  But,  given  the  caveats  that  the  Bosnian  parliament  is  im- 
posing on  acceptance,  he  may  still  say  no. 

What  do  you  see  happening  if  the  Bosnian  government  does  not 
ratify,  Madam  Ambassador?  I  don't  see  any  willingness  in  the 
West,  including  our  own  government,  for  a  'Hift  and  strike"  oper- 
ation. What  are  we  looking  at  this  winter? 

UNPROFOR  MANDATE 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick.  Thank  you,  Congressman.  I  believe  that  we 
are  looking  at  mass  starvation  and  more  deaths  than  last  winter 
because  the  population  now  is  weakened,  having  suffered  from  mal- 
nutrition and  homelessness,  and  the  most  terrible  kinds  of  abuse. 

It  is  my  understanding  that  the  parliament  of  Croatia  is  discuss- 
ing this.  The  parliament  of  Croatia  has  decided  that  they  will  not 
extend  the  UNPROFOR  mandate,  and  I  believe  that  the  Bosnian 
parliament  will  do  the  same.  This  is  my  understanding  of  what  is 
now  in  process. 

So  I  think  that  we  will  be  confronted  with  an  even  starker  deci- 
sion, if  possible.  And  I  am  not  sure  it  is  possible,  but  more  stark 
if  possible.  But  whether  we  are  in  fact  prepared  to  stand  by  pas- 
sively while  aggression  sponsored  from  Serbia  is  replenished  on  a 
daily  basis — as  I  am  told  by  a  Slovenian  defense  official — replen- 
ished on  a  daily  basis  with  supplies  and  weapons  and  ammunition 
and  food  from  Serbia  while,  you  know,  while  it  wipes  out  the  popu- 
lation of  Bosnia  and  Bosnian  Muslims.  I  don't  know  whether  we 
can  do  this  or  not. 

Frankly,  I  hope  we  cannot.  It  will  give  us  a  kind  of  measure  of 
who  we  are  at  this  moment  in  our  century. 

Mr.  McCloskey.  I  thank  you  very  much,  Madam  Ambassador. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Mr.  Roth. 

Mr.  Roth.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

It's  interesting  that  we  are  having  this  panel  here  today.  Yester- 
day, we  debated  on  the  floor  Somalia  and  how  we  are  going  to  get 
out  of  Somalia.  And  Somalia,  I  mean  there  we  are  just  faced  with 
a  gang  of  hoodlums.  But  look  what  we  are  faced  with  in  Bosnia- 
Hercegovina. 

Now,  people  here  have  had  all  kinds  of  metaphors — 1939  in 
Czechoslovakia.  What  happens  if  this  is  1914?  And  what  happens 
if  we  go  into  Bosnia-Hercegovina  and  we  inflame  that  entire  area? 
Why  wouldn't  that  happen? 

Look  what  is  going  on  in  Georgia.  Look  what  is  going  on  through- 
out the  entire  area.  Wouldn't  it  be  much  better  for  us  not  to  be  in- 
volved, not  to  put  our  troops  in? 

If  I  read  Ambassador  Kirkpatrick's  statement,  it's  like  a  clarion 
call — let's  get  involved.  Isn't  that  very  dangerous? 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick.  May  I? 

Mr.  Roth.  Yes. 

DEPLOYMENT  OF  U.S.  TROOPS 

Ms.  KmKPATRlCK.  My  recommendation  is  that  we  not  deploy 
American  armed  troops — American  forces — to  Bosnia  or  the  former 
Yugoslavia.  I  regretted  the  President's  decision  to  deploy  American 


24 

forces  to  Macedonia  because  I  think  that  constitute  a  kind  of  trip- 
wire. 

I  do  not  believe  we  should  deploy  50,000  U.S.  troops  or  25,000 
or  10,000  U.S.  troops  to  Bosnia. 

I  do  believe  that  we  should  take  the  lead  in  lifting  the  arms  em- 
bargo and  we  should  assist,  as  this  committee  decided  under  the 
Hyde  amendment,  I  think,  to  assist  the  Bosnians  in  securing  arms, 
and  if  necessary,  as  a  kind  of  last  resort  I  would  support  the  use 
of  U.S.  airpower  in  a  very  sharply  focused,  targeted  fashion  to 
produce  a  maximum  impact. 

But  I  do  not  believe  the  United  States  should  become  involved 
in  a  ground  war  in  Yugoslavia. 

Mr.  Roth.  Let  me  ask  you,  yesterday,  or  day  before  yesterday, 
the  President  enunciated  the  Clinton  doctrine  at  the  U.N.  He  had 
four  criteria  for  getting  involved.  What  do  you  think  of  those  cri- 
teria for  us  here  in  Congress  to  look  at? 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick.  You  know,  I  read  that  very  carefully,  Con- 
gressman. I  may  be  wrong,  even  after  having  read  it  carefully,  but 
I  believe  that  they  weren  t  criteria.  They  looked  like  criteria,  and 
when  you  read  them  carefully  it  turned  out  that  they  were  ques- 
tions which  he  said  the  United  States  was  now  insisting  that  the 
United  Nations  confront  before  it  made  a  decision  to  go  into  a  coun- 
try. 

But  it  didn't  set  up  criteria  and  it  told  us  nothing  about  what  the 
United  States  would  do  in  relationship  to  the  answers  to  those  var- 
ious questions,  I  think. 

Mr.  Lampe.  Congressman,  can  I  make  one  comment  on  that? 

Mr.  Roth.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lampe.  It  is  that  UNPROFOR  has  included  many  brave  sol- 
diers; there  are  some  who  have  lost  their  lives  in  Bosnia,  and 
UNPROFOR  has  done  quite  some  good  in  many  ways,  as  Misha 
Glenny  pointed  out.  But  UNPROFOR  is  there  under  a  mistaken 
mission.  It  is  there  as  a  peacekeeping  force,  and  there  was  no  peace 
when  it  became  a  peacekeeping  force  there.  It  should  have  been  a 
peace  making  force  or  it  shouldn't  have  been  assigned  in  that  ca- 
pacity. 

So  all  the  awkwardness  of  UNPROFOR,  all  the  clumsiness,  all 
the  mistakes  really  come  back  to  the  question  of  mission.  Mission 
is  vital,  and  this  was  the  wrong  mission. 

Mr.  Glenny.  May  I  comment  on  this  issue  in  terms  of  whether 
U.S.  troops  should  be  there  or  not.  Together  Western  Europe  and 
the  United  States  invested  an  enormous  amount  of  resources  and 
money  in  winning  the  cold  war  and  in  creating  a  tremendous  mili- 
tary and  security  machine — NATO. 

Now  that  we  nave  won  the  cold  war  and  we  have  a  chance  to  go 
forward,  we  need  that  military  machine  more  than  ever,  and  we 
need  stability  in  Europe  more  than  ever.  I  do  believe  that  we  are 
at  the  beginning  of  a  1914  scenario  in  Europe,  and  that  we  have 
to  do  something  to  stop  that. 

I  do  not  believe  that  by  bombing  the  Serbs  in  Bosnia-Hercegovina 
you  are  going  to  do  that,  because  all  you  are  going  to  do  then  is 
incur  the  wrath  and  the  ire  of  the  Russians,  who  despite  all  their 
economic  problems,  are  extremely  well  armed.  The  Russian  Foreign 
Minister,  Andrey  Kozyrev,  who  is  a  friend,  very  much  so,  of  the 


25 

United  States  and  Europe,  in  my  opinion,  has  warned  time  and 
time  again  that  this  will  have  an  extremely  negative  effect  on  the 
situation  inside  Russia. 

We  need  American  troops  in  Bosnia-Hercegovina  to  stop  this  war 
from  spreading.  You  can,  of  course,  it  is  your  sovereign  right  to  de- 
cide to  withdraw  American  troops  from  Europe  and  from  European 
operations.  I  would  plead  with  you  to  try  and  persuade  your  con- 
stituents to  understand  that  it  is  vital  tnat  the  United  States  re- 
mains in  Europe 

Mr.  Roth.  My  time  is  up,  so  I  can't  ask  any  more  questions.  I 
would  just  say  this:  I  am  supposed  to  encourage  my  constituents. 
If  peace  is  in  jeopardy  in  Europe,  then  let  the  Europeans  take  the 
lead  for  a  change. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Mr.  Oberstar. 

Mr.  Oberstar.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  Thank  you  for  bring- 
ing together  a  very  lively  panel  with  widely  divergent,  though  in 
some  respects  convergent,  views. 

PARTITION  OF  BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 

First,  an  observation.  After  many  years  of  studying  the  region, 
meeting  with  people  from  the  region,  having  more  than  a  passing — 
my  ancestry  on  father's  side  is  Slovene — I  am  convinced  that  the 
plan  to  partition  Bosnia-Hercegovina  is  a  curse  upon  the  region.  Its 
acceptance  by  the  international  community  will  condemn  the  peo- 
ple thereto  an  endless  cycle,  internecine  or  fratricidal  war,  IRA- 
Northern  Ireland-style,  but  with  much  more  unforgiving  hatred 
and  brutality  than  we  have  ever  seen  in  Northern  Ireland  or  to- 
ward England,  and  for  an  indeterminate  future. 
^  And  what  this  panel  has  offered  us  is  somewhat  an  analogy  of 
fighting  a  forest  fire,  which  we  have  some  experience  in  northern 
Minnesota:  on  the  one  hand,  the  proposal  to  try  to  contain  and  con- 
trol the  fire,  the  Geneva  plan,  with  a  sort  of  peacekeeping  force;  on 
the  other  hand,  suggestions  that  we  allow  the  fire  to  burn  out  or 
even  start  a  backfire  by  lifting  the  arms  embargo  and  using  air 
strikes. 

But  I  think  that  lifting  the  arms  embargo  is  just  simply  adding 
oxygen  to  the  forest  fire.  The  problem  is  that  fire  is  needed — and 
if  it  is  helped — to  burn  out  hundreds  of  thousands  of  more  people 
are  going  to  die. 

And  I  think  Ambassador  Kirkpatrick's  point  that  the  Serbs  un- 
derstand only  the  language  of  force,  I  think  that  is  right,  though 
we  didn't  use  that  force  at  the  time  when  we  should  nave.  There 
was  an  opportunity  to  do  that. 

And,  as  Mr.  Gutman  said,  this  is  not  a  war  among  equals.  That 
is  true  to.  The  only  equality  is  the  level  of  hatred  for  one  another. 

I  remember  so  well  the  history  I  read  of  the  region  following  par- 
tition after,  or  joining  of  the  kingdom  of  Serbs,  Croats  and 
Slovenes,  and  a  German  observer  said,  "Yes,  that  is  right" — in  the 
Serbo-Croatian  language  the  initials  are  SHS — "Serbski,  Hrvatski, 
Slovenski" — and  in  German  "die  Hassenischte" — they  hate  each 
other. 

That  hatred  continues.  It  was  abated  for  a  time.  And  I  think 
there  was — if  there  were  a  decisive  point  in  the  evolution  of  post- 
Tito  Yugoslavia,  it  was  that  moment,  June  1991,  when  Secretary 


26 

of  State  Baker  went  to  Belgrade,  on  June  12,  and  he  emerged  from 
a  meeting  of  the  presidency  and  said  that  the  United  States  stands 
firmly  for  the  territorial  integrity  of  Yugoslavia,  defying  history,  de- 
fying what  had  happened. 

And  if  the  United  States  had  taken  its  historical  stand  in  favor 
of  the  self-determination  of  peoples  and  said  that  what  the  plebi- 
scite in  Slovenia  directed  and  what  the  plebiscite  in  Croatia  di- 
rected should  not  be  suppressed  or  interfered  with. 

It  is  evident  if  the  people  wanted  separation  and  independence 
and  stood  for  it,  I  think,  with  a  clear  determination  of  force,  the 
Serbs  would  not  have  attacked. 

We  missed  that  point  in  history,  and  I  don't — you  know,  in  say- 
ing all  this,  I  don't  have  a  solution.  Our  choice  is  only  do  we  go 
in  and  stop  the  war  and  enforce  the  peace,  or  do  we  somehow  stand 
around  and  wait  for  peace  to  happen  itself  and  then  come  in  with 
others  and  enforce  an  internally  agreed  upon  peace,  and  that  is  not 
going  to  happen. 

Mr.  Lampe.  Congressman,  if  I  could  respond  to  the  way  that  you 
have  put  all  of  the  terrible  alternatives  here  in  front  of  us  and  put 
forward  the  notion  of  controlling  the  forest  fire,  such  fire  fighting 
has  serious  problems  and  it  is  lamentable  in  many  respects,  but 
compared  to  the  alternatives  it  does  seem  to  be  the  only  choice  that 
is  left. 

There  is  controversy  about  what  Secretary  Baker  actually  said  in 
Belgrade  in  June  of  1991.  There  is  a  version  that  says,  "We  support 
in  the  United  States  territorial  integrity  and  democracy  in  Yugo- 
slavia, but  if  we  have  to  choose  between  the  two,  we  would  choose 
democracy  first."  But  that  is  not  written  down  in  anyway  that  I 
have  seen. 

But  in  any  case,  we  are  a  long  way  from  there,  and  down  in  a 
circle  where  the  choices  are  by  any  standard  worse  than  they  were. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Mr.  Leach. 

Mr.  Leach.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  appreciate  your  calling 
this  hearing  and  have  been  very  interested  in  all  the  comments.  In 
tying  them  together,  I  think  when  Mr.  Hyde  referenced  the  word 
"intractable"  that  is  the  most  descriptive  word  of  the  day. 

I  also  think  Professor  Lampe  is  right  to  talk  about  alternatives 
at  various  points  in  time. 

Here  let  me  just  say,  Ambassador  Kirkpatrick,  I  find  your  cri- 
tique of  everything  that  has  happened  terribly  valid.  On  the  other 
hand,  I  am  not  sure  I  am  persuaded  by  your  alternative.  One  of 
our  problems  is  how  to  stand  up  for  the  principle  that  aggression 
shouldn't  be  rewarded  in  the  context  of  the  current  conflict.  If  you 
suggest  that  it  is  wholly  and  unambiguously  an  international  con- 
flict to  which  America  must  vigorously  respond,  but  then  severely 
limit  our  military  options,  it  suggests  a  kind  of  posturing  statement 
rather  than  a  serious  one. 

We  all  recognize  that  there  are  aspects  of  American  policy  that 
make  it  difficult  to  consider  sending  ground  troops  in.  Your  alter- 
native, though,  of  air  strikes  has  some  diffident  appeal  as  well  as 
some  disadvantages  too.  Because  if  you  are  going  to  have  air 
strikes,  you  are  going  to  have  to  be  able  to  assert  that  they  in  and 
of  themselves  are  going  to  turn  back  a  Croatian  and  Serbian  policy 
that  you  may  not  Tike.  And  if  they  can't,  I  mean  if  you  can't  reach 


27 

that  conclusion,  and  I  frankly  have  a  hard  time  reaching  it,  then 
almost  inevitably  that  means  you  have  got  to  send  in  troops. 

And  so  then  air  strikes  are  a  leading  indicator  of  troops  coming 
in  because  I  don't  think  you  can  strike  and  then  rule  out  further 
escalation  if  airstrikes  fail. 

STRIKE  AND  LIFT 

We  also  have  a  problem  with  the  policy  of  strike  and  lift,  and  I 
think  the  case  for  lifting  the  embargo  is  probably  stronger  than 
otherwise,  although  I  realize  there  is  a  pro  and  con  to  it.  But  if  you 
combine  lifting  the  embargo  with  airstrikes,  almost  certainly  the 
Europeans  will  define  this  as  Americanizing  responsibility  and  they 
are  going  to  want  to  be  withdrawing  even  further  from  the  limited 
accountability  they  have  so  far  undertaken,  and  that  strikes  me  as 
an  extraordinary  dilemma  that  the  United  States  should  kind  of 
shy  away  from. 

Now,  in  your  written  statement  you  pose  the  problem  of  U.S. 
troops  not  under  U.S.  command  and  control.  That  is  one  of  the  is- 
sues of  multilateralism  that  all  societies  face,  and  particularly  the 
United  States. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  we  have  total  U.S.  command  and  control, 
we  also  have  a  circumstance  of  Americanizing  accountability.  And 
my  own  sense  in  all  of  this  is  that  all  of  the  alternatives  are  lousy, 
but  your  prescription  goes  the  furthest  toward  delegitimatizing  the 
peace  negotiation  process.  If  you  do  that,  you  almost  guarantee  con- 
tinued conflict.  Professor  Lampe  suggested  then,  and  to  read  his 
first  paragraph,  it  will  surely  cost  many  more  thousands  of  lives 
and  spread  beyond  the  Bosnian  border,  most  likely  to  Kosovo,  Mac- 
edonia and  beyond.  That  is,  if  the  war  continues  or  resumes  next 
spring.  And  that  has  great  difficulty. 

So  it  strikes  me  that  the  dilemma  for  the  United  States  in  terms 
of  the  least  bad  alternatives  almost  inevitably  comes  down  to  hav- 
ing to  support  a  process,  even  though  the  basis  for  that  process  is 
pretty  lousy. 

As  Jim  Oberstar  said,  we  might  have  gone  in  at  an  earlier  time. 
But  having  not  gone  in,  we  are  somewhat  accountable  for  the  situa- 
tion we  are  now  in,- and  the  best  we  can  do  is  support  a  process, 
as  weak  as  that  process  may  be. 

If  you  support  a  process,  then  what  accountability  comes  next? 
And  the  accountability  that  could  come  next  is  some  sort  of  peace- 
keeping arrangement. 

Then  the  question  becomes  whether  we  play  a  big  role  or  a  small 
role?  Mr.  Glenny  suggests,  and  I  think  he  reflects  a  European  atti- 
tude, that  Americans  have  to  come  in  big.  I  am  not  so  sure  that 
is  our  desire. 

This  also  raises  an  interesting  dilemma,  on  a  nationalistic  basis, 
of  command  and  control.  I  think  there  are  advantages  of  having  a 
NATO  commander  from,  let's  say,  Holland  or  whatever,  so  that  it 
is  clearly  primarily  European  accountability. 

But  are  you  opposed  to  any  and  all  American  involvement  if 
there  is  a  peace  agreement  that  takes  place  or  are  you  opposed  to 
any  ground  forces  under  any  conditions  at  this  time?  And  if  you  are 
opposed  to  any  and  all  American  ground  forces,  can  you  possibly 
say  this  is  fundamentally  a  moral  issue,  that  aggression  has  to  be 


28 

averted?  Because  if  it  is,  then  you  have — that  strikes  me  an  im- 
moral response. 

I  mean  is  that  a  valid  way  of  looking  at  this  or  not? 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick.  Is  that  a  question  to  me? 

Mr.  Leach.  Yes. 

Ms.  Kirkpatrick.  Thank  you,  Congressman  Leach. 

First  of  all,  I  don't  seriously  absolutely  oppose  any  and  all  Amer- 
ican ground  troops  anyplace  in  what  was  Yugoslavia,  in  Macedonia, 
on  its  borders  or  in  the  country.  I  regret  it  but  I  don't  necessarily 
definitively  oppose  it. 

What  strikes  me  about  this,  the  process,  if  you  will,  is  will  we 
support  a  process?  Should  we  support  a  process,  oppose  a  process, 
take  part  in  a  process?  What  kind  of  a  process  is  it? 

You  know,  do  we  want  to  take  part  in  a  process  that  promotes 
peace  and  justice  and  respect  the  U.N.  charter,  for  example,  and 
values  of  the  charter,  and  of  our  Constitution?  Sure,  I  think  we 
should  support  such  a  process. 

Should  we  participate  in  a  process  or  commit  ourselves  to  enforc- 
ing a  process  that  simply  repeats  all  the  moral  and  political  and 
finally  military  mistakes  of  appeasement?  No,  I  don't  think  we 
should  enforce  such  a  process. 

Sometimes  this  discussion  about  Bosnia  reminds  me  of,  you 
know,  what  it  would  have  been  like  to  propose  a  process  to  end 
World  War  II  at  the  point  the  British  troops  were  at  Dunkirk  and 
the  Nazi's  controlled  the  Benelux  states  and  France.  And  we  said, 
"Well,  this  is  a  terrible  war  and  many  people  are  dying  and  suffer- 
ing, and  surely  we  want  to  be  a  part  of  the  peace  process.  We  don't 
want  to  be  a  part  of  a  war  process." 

I  guess  I  think  that  it  is,  finally,  not  acceptable  to  ask  for  an 
American  President  to  ask  American  Armed  Forces  to  enforce  a 
peace  that  violates  the  most  fundamental  values  of  the  charter,  for 
example,  which  are  in  fact  to,  you  know,  forbid  aggression  and  to 
provide  self-defense. 

ARMS  EMBARGO 

You  know  one  of  the  reasons  that  I  think  the  arms  embargo  is 
so  heinous  is  that  it  is  a  violation  of  Article  51  of  the  U.N.  charter 
which  guarantees  states — it  doesn't  guarantee,  it  recognizes — the 
inherent  right  of  states  to  self-defense.  The  arms  embargo  has  de- 
nied to  Bosnia  and  attempted  to  deny  to  Croatia  the  right  to  self- 
defense. 

And  it  is  a  violation  of  the  prohibitions  on  aggression. 

I  think  that  it  will  not  bring  peace.  Now,  you  know,  I  remember 
I  was  in  France  at  the  time  that  then  President  of  the  EC,  Mr. 
Puce  of  Luxembourg,  said  about  the  outbreak  of  violence  in  Croatia 
and  the  attacks  on  Croatia — at  that  point  Serbian  attacks  on  Cro- 
atia— that  this  was  a  European  war  which  was  the  business  of  Eu- 
ropeans to  deal  with,  and  that  there  was  no  role  for  Americans  in 
it. 

I  had  a  sense  at  that  moment  that  President  Bush  must  have 
thought  to  himself.  Great!  You  take  this  one!  You  know,  and  we  all 
know  what  happened,  and  I  don't  have  any  further  comment  on 
that. 


29 

I  think  your  questions  and  comments  are  all  good  ones,  let  me 
say. 

Mr.  Leach.  Let  me — Mr.  Chairman,  we  are  in  the  business  of 
finding  great  insight  in  all  these  perspectives.  I  think  your  perspec- 
tive is  loaded  with  insight. 

It  could  well  be  this  is  an  issue  that  in  the  final  measure  the 
United  States  should  simply  declare  as  European  responsibility. 
That  is  a  quite  conceivable  endpoint. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  think  if  the  United  States  plays  a  role,  we 
ought  to  be  very  cautious  about  anything  that  (a)  is  so  belligent 
that  it  causes  more  problems  than  otherwise  and  (b)  de- 
Europeanizes  the  conflict.  I  am  also  apprehensive  about  air  strikes. 
I  think  we  have  to  be  careful  not  to  deny  the  option,  but  at  the 
same  time  be  very  cautious  about  employing  the  option. 

If  there  is  a  peace  settlement,  I  think  we  ought  to  reserve  the 
option  to  participate  depending  upon  the  circumstance  at  the  time 
without  necessarily  advocating  that  we  get  involved. 

But  I  don't  think  we  should  deny  the  option.  And  I  think  all  of 
these  options  have  to  be  maintained  on  the  table  despite  the  histor- 
ical circumstance  that  is  so  unneat. 

Mr.  Glenny.  May  I  make  a  very  brief  comment  about  the  pres- 
ence of  American  troops  and  why  it  is  so  important  for  the  Euro- 
peans? It  is  that  we  have  extremely  limited  resources  because  Ger- 
man troops  and  Italian  troops  cannot  be  deployed  in  Europe,  and 
we  already  have  substantial  troops  deployed  inside  Bosnia- 
Hercegovina  and  Croatia  already. 

That  is  why  I  appeal  as  I  do  for  a  substantial  American  force  be- 
cause the  Europeans  cannot  do  it  on  their  own,  firstly,  and  we 
don't  have,  Europe  as  a  whole,  the  same  professional  standards  in- 
side our  militaries.  There  is  too  much  variation  between  the  var- 
ious countries  and  we  simply  don't  have  the  men 

Mr.  Roth.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  constrained  to  ask.  There  are 
German  troops  in  Somalia.  Why  couldn't  you  have  German  troops 
in  Bosnia?  That  seems  like  a  weak  argument. 

Mr.  Glenny.  Because  German  troops  inside  Somalia  do  not  have 
the  same  historical  echoes  as  German  troops  inside  the  former 
Yugoslavia  or  anywhere  else  in  Europe. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Mr.  Smith. 

Mr.  Smith.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Chairman.  Just  a  couple 
of  brief  comments  and  then  one  question. 

You  know,  I  would  agree  with  Ambassador  Kirkpatrick  when  she 
makes  the  point  about  President  Bush's  view  that  this  was  a  Euro- 
pean problem. 

I  remember  very  clearly  that  with  the  perhaps  exception  of  Ger- 
many, every  other  nation,  its  foreign  minister,  its  President  and  all 
other  players  were  admonishing  the  U.S.  to  stay  out.  Lord 
Carrington  would  call  General  Scowcroft  and  others  and  say  this 
is  an  European  problem;  former  Secretary  of  State  Cyrus  Vance 
would  say  likewise.  When  we  were  in — Frank  Wolf  and  I  were  in 
Vukovar  and  Ocijek  3  months  after  the  fighting  began  in  Croatia, 
everyone  with  whom  we  spoke  to  other  than  those  who  are  in  the 
cities  being  decimated  were  saying  that  it  is  a  European  problem, 
other  than  those  who  were  being  attacked,  of  course,  or  the  Euro- 
pean diplomats  with  whom  we  spoke. 


30 

The  President  finally  came  around  to  a  different  view,  and  Sec- 
retary Baker,  later  on  when  they  saw  that  the  Europeans  were 
dropping  the  ball.  So,  you  know,  for  whatever  it  is  worth,  the  Presi- 
dent was  heeding  the  advice  of  those  who  were  seemingly  closest 
to  the  fray  and  took  his  cues  accordingly. 

Let  me  just  say,  Professor  Lampe,  when  a  couple  of  us,  and  I 
think,  Frank,  you  were  there,  members  of  the  Helsinki  Commission 
met  with  President  Izetbegovic  a  few  weeks  ago  over  on  the  Senate 
side,  he  was  painfully  candid  that  the  Bosnian  Serb  military  lead- 
ership had  completely  and  totally  dismissed  the  threat  of  an  air 
strike  from  the  Clinton  administration.  They  thought  it  was  bluff 
and  bluster. 

The  political  leadership  of  the  Serbs  thought  it  might  be  real. 
Milosevich  certainly  stepped  in  and  all  of  a  sudden  had  the  face  of 
a  peacemaker,  which  was  somewhat  of  a  strange  deal,  but  the 
Bosnian  Serb  commander  said,  No  way  that  is  going  to  happen, 
and  were  advising  their  counterparts  who  were  working  the  politi- 
cal end  of  it  not  to  give  in,  to  hunker  down  because  the  American 
threat  was  a  false  one. 

I  say  that  because  now  we  are  dealing  with  another  potential  for- 
eign policy  decision  that  we  will  be  called  upon  to  make,  the  pos- 
sible deployment  of  American  troops.  And  yet  in  your  testimony 
you  point  out  that  the  "getting"  in  criteria  is  troubling  to  you  be- 
cause it  seems  to  be  set  up  in  such  away  that  we  never  get  in. 

And,  you  know,  some  of  us  who  have  watched  the  President  care- 
fully over  these  many  months,  looking  at  a  budget  that  was  filled 
with  smoke  and  mirrors  while  all  the  while  the  testimony  was  to 
the  contrary,  who  have  watched  him  talk  about  NAFTA  but  then 
the  word  seem  to  be  going  through  that  this  isn't  very  high  on  the 
agenda,  and  time  and  time  again  a  stated  position  is  not  backed 
up  with  the  kind  of  ancillary  support  that  is  necessary  to  secure 
the  day. 

Now,  looking  at  all  of  these  criteria,  and  you  talk  about  most 
troubling  that  there  be  a  pulling  back  of  troops  and  heavy  weapons, 
is  it  your  view,  and  if  you  would  amplify  on  that,  whether  or  not 
you  think  that  is  feasible  that  this  pull  back  can  occur  or  whether 
or  not  this  is  another  ruse  that  will  disappoint  in  the  end  because 
in  the  end  there  will  be  no  troop  deployment? 

Mr.  Lampe.  I  wouldn't  call  it  a  ruse,  Congressman,  but  I  would 
call  it  an  illusion  that  this  could,  in  fact,  take  place  in  some  sort 
of  verifiable  way. 

I  am  glad  you  raise  the  issue  of  air  strikes.  I  think  it  is  under- 
standable that  the  Bosnian  Serb  command  after  the  several  occa- 
sions when  it  was  promised  that  we  would  do  something— the  next 
time  you  people  step  out  of  line  in  comes  the  U.S.  Air  Force — and 
it  hasn't  come  too  many  times  for  there  to  be  any  credibility  at  the 
top. 

At  the  same  time  one  hears,  and  maybe  Misha  Glenny  would 
have  some  comment  on  this,  from  the  commanders  or  intelligence 
from  the  Bosnian  Serb  side,  that  were  there  to  be  some  use  of 
American  airpower  it  would  be  greatly  feared  and  respected. 

At  the  same  time  I  would  add  the  comments  of  Austrian  defense 
analysts  who  are,  as  you  know,  deadly  determined  to  oppose  the 
Bosnian  Serb  side,  but  have  the  great  fear  that  a  first  strike  would 


31 

have  some  significant  effect,  but  after  that  there  would  be  such  a 
scattering  of  the  mortars  and  men  that  you  wouldn't  find  any  sig- 
nificant forces  to  strike  after  one  strike. 

Mr.  Smith.  Could  you  amplify  on  what  troubles  you  with  regards 
to  the  "getting"  in  criteria  which  you  spoke  to  in  your  testimony? 

Mr.  Lampe.  What  troubles  me  there  is  what  happens  if  there  is 
a  settlement  that  the  Izetbegovic  government  can  sign  off  on  and 
then  there  is  a  period  of  weeks  or  even  months  when  there  is  no 
one  on  the  ground  to  enforce  that  settlement.  What  if  there  isn't 
a  prospect  that  there  is  a  separating  force  is  coming?  Then  that 
will  just  be  another  cease-fire  that  will  not  hold,  and  the  elements 
of  any  successful  longer  term  cease-fire  are  the  very  points  of  with- 
drawing the  heavy  weapons  and  the  troops  pulling  back.  I  don't 
think  the  local  commanders,  maybe  even  the  top  people  too,  but 
certainly  the  local  commanders  are  going  to  do  that  pulling  back 
there  until  they  see  the  U.S.  marshal  and  the  smell  of  gun  smoke. 

And  that  is  not  necessarily  gun  smoke.  But  the  smell  of  it,  I 
think,  is  about  all  we  have  got  left. 

Mr.  Smith.  Well,  if  that  is  a  precondition,  does  that  give  the  Serb 
military  commanders  a  kind  of  veto  power  to  prevent  the  deploy- 
ment from  occurring? 

Mr.  Lampe.  I  think  that  actual  deployment  might  be  resisted. 
But  then  if  that  is  going  to  be  resisted,  then  we  shouldn't  come  in 
because  we  are  not  doing  our  part  for  what  would  be  a  credible 
agreement  for  the  Bosnian  Muslims. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Mr.  Bereuter. 

Mr.  BEREUTER.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

First,  I  have  to  respectfully  disagree  with  my  colleague,  Mr. 
Oberstar.  The  Bush  administration's  decision,  as  voiced  by  Sec- 
retary Baker's  Belgrade  speech  in  1990  was  exactly  the  right  deci- 
sion. 

SE  LF-DETERMINATION 

Unfortunately,  when  self-determination  was  expressed  in  Slove- 
nia and  then  subsequently  in  Croatia,  it  ignited  the  hatreds  and  it 
gave  an  opportunity  for  all  of  the  conflagration  to  be  ignited.  It  was 
entirely  predictable.  In  fact,  our  intelligence  committee  predicted  in 
graphic  detail  precisely  what  would  happen  right  down  through 
Bosnia  into  Macedonia. 

Sometimes  there  are  more  important  things,  believe  it  or  not, 
than  self-determination. 

MACEDONIA 

But  I  want  to  talk  about  Macedonia,  and  particularly  raise  ques- 
tions for  Mr.  Glenny,  although  others  could  offer  their  comments 
too.  First,  to  make  it  clear,  I  am  one  of  those  people  that  believes 
we  ought  to  have  1,000  or  2,000  heavily  armed  U.S.  troops  with 
clear,  no  nonsense  rules  of  engagement  under  a  U.S.  commander 
in  Macedonia.  Not  as  a  tripwire,  because  they  wouldn't  be.  They 
would  be  a  firebreak  force  to  keep  us  from  internationalizing  or 
Balkanizing  this  war  and  bringing  terrible  conflicts  between  NATO 
allies  Greece  and  Turkey  as  well  as  Albanian  and  Bulgarian  dif- 
ficulties. 


32 

Mr.  Glenny,  I  know  you  are  particularly  knowledgeable  on  Mac- 
edonia, although  probably  all  of  you  are.  I  have  three  questions. 
First,  is  the  greatest  problem  confronting  Macedonia  the  threat  of 
invasion  from  Serbia,  or  Serbian  actions  at  least,  or  is  it  the  grow- 
ing internal  problems  in  Macedonia  with  a  large  Albanian  minority 
and  the  Slav  Macedonians? 

Second,  what  do  you  expect  to  happen  if  the  major  ethnic  Alba- 
nian party  pulls  out  of  the  fragile  centrist  coalition  that  now  rules 
Macedonia? 

Third,  should  we,  the  United  States,  move  more  quickly  or  move 
at  all  to  full  diplomatic  relations  with  Macedonia?  And  if  so,  why? 

Mr.  Glenny.  As  regards  the  first  question,  my  belief  is  that  the 
primary  problem  in  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  is 
Albanian  and  Slav  Macedonian  relations  inside  that  republic.  That 
it  is  a  deterioration  of  the  relationship  between  those  two  commu- 
nities which  will  spark  a  war. 

Then  comes  the  secondary  problem  of  intervention  in  one  form  or 
another  from  Albania,  from  Serbia,  and  from  Bulgaria.  Greece  and 
Turkey,  I  do  not  believe  in  the  first  instance,  would  become  in- 
volved in  that  war,  but  they  would  certainly  be  involved  by  proxy. 

So  the  main  problem  for  me  is  Albanian-Slav-Macedonian  rela- 
tions. Serbia  is  not  about  to  invade  Macedonia.  But  if  there  was  a 
breakdown  of  internal  stability  in  Macedonia,  then  certainly  I  be- 
lieve Serbia  would  move  and  try  and  lop  off  the  northern  part. 

For  that  reason,  your  suggestion  of  deploying  1,000  to  2,000 
heavily  armed  troops  on  the  borders,  in  my  opinion,  is  a  good  one, 
so  that  in  the  instance  of  serious  trouble  between  the  Albanians 
and  the  Slav  Macedonians,  then  the  surrounding  states  would  not 
respond,  would  not  be  tempted  to  come  in. 

As  regards  the  PDP,  the  Albanian  party  inside  Macedonia,  and 
if  the  PDP  pulls  out,  there  is  a  very  disturbing  conflict  within  the 
PDP  at  the  moment.  If  the  radicals  went  inside  the  PDP,  then  we 
could  be  heading  toward  a  breakdown  of  stability  inside  Macedo- 
nia. 

My  own  feeling  is,  however,  at  the  moment  that  they  will  not 
succeed  in  doing  so,  and  that  we  will  see  for  the  next  year  or  so 
before  elections  take  place  a  maintenance  of  the  coalition  between 
Macedonians  and  Albanians  which  is  exceptionally  important. 

As  regards  full  diplomatic  relations  with  Macedonia,  you  have 
got  to  handle  the  Greek  problem  very,  very  carefully,  because  one 
of  the  things  accentuating  and  making  worse  the  problems  inside 
Macedonia  are  the  sanctions  on  Serbia  and  the  deterioration  of  the 
economic  situation  inside  Macedonia. 

And  if  Greece  were  to  respond  and  Mr.  Papandreou,  who  is  now 
favored  to  win  the  elections  on  October  10,  were  to  respond  to  the 
establishment  of  full  relations  with  Macedonia  as  the  Republic  of 
Macedonia  by  imposing  a  complete  blockade  of  Macedonia's  south- 
ern border,  then  this  really  would  have  very,  very  severe  con- 
sequences for  the  Macedonian  economy. 

And  so,  you  know,  however  awkward  the  Greeks  sometimes  may 
appear  to  be  on  this  issue,  one  does  have  to  take  into  account  what 
they  are  saying  for  pragmatic  reasons,  if  nothing  else. 

Mr.  Lampe.  Congressman,  let  me  second  what  Misha  Glenny  has 
said.  I  very  much  regret  the  political  circumstances  in  Greece  that 


33 

do  inhibit  the  United  States  from  the  immediate  diplomatic  rec- 
ognition. 

There  is  absolutely  no  objective  reason  not  to  do  that.  The  EC 
had  identified  Macedonia  and  Slovenia  as  the  two  Yugoslav  Repub- 
lics several  years  ago  that  did  deserve  immediate  recognition. 

At  the  same  time  I  would  endorse  your  notion  of  the  several 
thousand  troops  ready,  in  fact,  with  active  rules  of  engagement  be- 
cause the  Bulgarian  Prime  Minister,  Lyuben  Berov,  told  me  this 
summer  when  I  asked  about  the  320  and  the  very  cautious 
UNPROFOR-like  rules  under  which  they  were  there,  he  said  well 
that  we  really  cannot  take  that  as  any  serious  enterprise.  The  Mac- 
edonians would  have  to  protect  them  from  anything  that  would 
come  their  way,  rather  than  the  other  way  around.  It  made  me  feel 
embarrassed  to  have  to  hear  that  from  a  foreign  leader. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Mr.  Royce. 

PUNISHING  AGGRESSION 

Mr.  Royce.  Yes.  I  think  it  is  always  good  at  some  point  after  we 
have  talked  ourselves  into  inaction  to  get  back  to  basic  principles, 
and  the  basic  principle  in  this  case  which  I  think  we  have  to  re- 
member is  that  this  plan  is  a  plan  which  is  going  to  reward.  It  is 
going  to  reward  aggression. 

And  in  that  sense  it  is  not  unlike  the  partition  of  Czechoslovakia 
in  the  sense  that  it  wasn't  just  Chamberlain  allowing  the  partition 
to  occur  that  caused  so  much  animosity.  It  was  the  fact  that  he 
wasn't  a  signatory  to  the  agreement. 

In  this  case  we  are  asked  to  be  not  only  signatories  to  the  agree- 
ment but  we  are  asked  to  enforce  the  peace  after  the  partition  has 
occurred. 

My  own  observation  is  that  we  would  be  better  served  by  sticking 
with  basic  principles  and  lifting  the  arms  embargo  and  punishing 
aggression  by  bombing  the  Serb  artillery  positions.  But  if  we  don't 
have  the  will  to  do  that,  if  we  aren't  going  to  follow  through  with 
principle,  then  I  do  not  understand  the  United  States  making  the 
commitment  to  take  25,000  troops  and  hold  them  as  potential  hos- 
tages to  everyone  who  is  frustrated  in  this  conflict. 

Mr.  Glenny  stated  that  peace  is  in  jeopardy  in  Europe,  and  the 
plan  here  is  this  appeasement  may  work  to  salvage  that  peace.  I 
don't  understand  why  it  should  be  25,000  American  troops  that 
would  be  put  into  this  situation  where  they  are  to  be  held  hostage 
by  all  of  the  frustrations  of  all  of  the  people  in  the  former  Yugo- 
slavia now  that  the  United  States  has  failed  to  act. 

Mr.  Glenny.  I  understand  your  concerns,  sir.  I  sympathize  with 
them  very  much. 

Remember  this  is  25,000  troops  within  a  projected  force  of 
50,000.  Twenty-five  thousand  other  troops  would  come  largely  from 
European  Community  countries,  also  some  Scandinavian  countries, 
and  possibly  from  Russia  as  well.  So  that  is  one  thing. 

Secondly,  the  fact  of  the  matter  is  the  international  community 
contributed  substantially  to  the  creation  of  this  situation — I  must 
stress  this — by  recognizing  Croatia  prematurely.  It  is  obvious  from 
June  1990  onwards  that  Yugoslavia  in  its  federal  state  could  not 
continue  and  at  some  point  we  would  have  to  recognize  individual 
states. 


34 

But  we  could  only  go  ahead  with  recognition  once  agreement  had 
been  reached  between  the  majority  and  minority  populations.  If  we 
did  that  prematurely,  which  is  what  happened,  we  merely  fan  the 
flames  of  war. 

Finally,  I  would  have  to  say  I  will  be  perfectly  honest.  You  know 
I  have  been  covering  this  war  from  well  before  the  beginning.  I 
have  been  watching  what  is  going  on  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the 
former  Soviet  Union.  I  am  really  panicking  about  the  future  of  Eu- 
rope now. 

I  am  really  worried  that  we  are  moving  toward  an  enormous  con- 
flagration on  this  continent  and  that  is  why  I  would  make — I  make 
this  appeal  for  the  Americans  to  help  us.  We  need  you  and  we  need 
you  badly.  And  it  is  in  your  interest  as  well  ultimately,  I  believe. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Mr.  McCloskey  has  a  final  question. 

Mr.  McCloskey.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Chairman. 

CONDITIONS  IN  CAMP 

Mr.  Gutman,  in  your  book  "Witness  to  Genocide",  based  on  your 
trailblazing  news  dispatches,  you  describe  the  conditions  in  the 
concentration  camps,  the  acts  of  the  Serb  captors  and  so  forth. 

Can  you  tell  us  what  happened  to  those  camps  and  those  pris- 
oners after  you  got  the  word  out?  Specifically,  do  the  camps  still 
exist  and  has  there  been  Western  access  to  them?  Are  the  Serbs 
out  of  the  genocide  business  in  that  particular  area? 

Mr.  Gutman.  Congressman,  the  news  reports  followed  by  a  great 
deal  of  public  attention  and  statements  by  governments  focused  the 
world  on  the  Serbs  and  focused  the  Serbs  on  themselves.  I  think 
that  it  caused  political  forces  within  the  Bosnian  Serb  group  and 
also  within  Serbia  itself  to  reconsider  what  they  had  done,  what 
they  had  set  up,  and  almost  overnight  one  of  the  major  camps, 
Omarska,  where  there  were  at  least  2,000  or  3,000  men,  was  closed 
down  and  the  prisoners  were  dispersed. 

Other  camps  closed  in  the  course  of  the  following  month.  In  fact, 
over  a  period  of  4  to  5  months,  as  I  understand  it,  analysts  here 
have  reached  this  conclusion,  the  behavior  of  the  Bosnian  Serb 
forces  was  altered  significantly.  There  was  a  significant  reduction 
in  the  genocide.  I  wouldn't  say  anyone  is  on  good  behavior.  But 
there  were  so  many  delegations  coming  through,  so  many  questions 
being  asked,  so  much  interest,  that  it  was  not  possible  to  carry  on 
with  this  process. 

The  interest  regrettably  diminished  at  the  end  of  last  year.  There 
was  not  a  great  deal  of  followup  or  follow-through  by  Western  gov- 
ernments. It  so  happens,  though,  as  I  mentioned  earlier,  that  the 
American  Government  and  other  governments  began  collecting  in- 
formation from  the  refugees,  from  the  survivors  of  these  camps, 
and  this  information  has  now  been  compiled.  It  has  gone  to  the 
U.N.  Commission  on  War  Crimes.  It  is  really  quite  overwhelming. 
It  is  quite  interesting.  It  is,  unfortunately,  not  available  to  the  pub- 
lic. 

I  think  that  it  is  possible  though  through  the  use  of  that  informa- 
tion to  discover  just  what  is  the  impact  of  the  public  attention  that 
was  suddenly  focused  on  the  camps  at  that  time.  For  the  sake  of 
the  prisoners,  it  was  really  quite  beneficial. 

Mr.  McCloskey.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 


35 

Mr.  Lampe.  If  I  could  just  call  the  committee's  attention  to  an  ar- 
ticle by  David  Ottaway  in  the  Washington  Post,  I  mention  it  in  my 
text,  on  September  12,  because  that  is  the  best  recent  update  on 
what  has  been  happening  on  other  sides  in  this  unfortunate  matter 
of  ethnic  cleansing. 

Chairman  Hamilton.  Thank  you.  Let  me  express  my  apprecia- 
tion to  each  one  of  you  for  your  excellent  testimony.  We  are  very 
pleased  to  have  had  you  with  us. 

The  committee  stands  adjourned. 

[Whereupon,  at  12:17  p.m.,  the  committee  was  recessed,  to  recon- 
vene subject  to  the  call  of  the  Chair.] 


APPENDIX 


Statement  before  the  House  of  Representatives 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 
September  29,  1993 

By  Roy  Gutman 

Newsday  European  Correspondent 

Mr.  Chairman  and  members  of  the  committee.  The  series 
of  wars  over  the  succession  to  Yugoslavia  culminating  in  the 
war  in  Bosnia  is  clearly  an  extraordinary  event  in  this  post 
Cold  War  era.  Despite  all  the  coverage  by  the  news  media, 
uncertainty  and  confusion  seem  to  dominate  the  public 
debate.  One  can  only  welcome  that  your  decision  to  hold  a 
hearing  to  shed  light  on  the  topic;  it  is  an  honor  to  me  and 
my  newspaper  to  be  invited  to  appear.  My  published  reports 
are  in  a  sense  my  testimony;  at  the  same  time,  as  one  of 
relatively  few  Americans  to  have  spent  time  on  the  ground 
and  to  have  reported  some  of  the  terrible  events  that  have 
occurred,  I  feel  obliged  to  make  such  knowledge  or  analysis 
as  I  have  available  to  any  serious  inquiry. 

As  you  weigh  the  next  steps,  it  may  be  helpful  to 
review  what  has  occurred.  I  am  convinced  from  my  own 
reporting  of  a  pattern  or  rather  patterns  of  atrocities, 
primarily,  but  not  exclusively,  by  the  Bosnian  Serb  armed 
forces.  The  patterns  include  the  following:   the  destruction 
and  siege  of  villages  and  cities,  massacres  and  extra- 
judicial executions  of  unarmed  civilians,  mass  deportations 
in  subhuman  conditions  such  as  cattle  cars,  rounding  up  of 
enormous  numbers  of  men  and  a  smaller  number  of  women  in 
camps  where  chey  were  beaten  or  starved  to  death  at  the  rate 
of  50  or  100  a  day;  the  systematic  rape  of  women,  singling 
out  unmarried  women  of  childbearing  age;  the  setting  up  of 
camps  where  women  were  held  and  repaed;  the  harassment, 
robbery,  and  murder  of  refugees  in  flight;  the  destruction 
of  every  last  mosque  and  now,  it  appears,  every  last  Roman 
Catholic  church  in  the  areas  under  Serb  control.  There  are 
only  estimates,  but  it  seems  quite  plausible  that  200,000 
people  have  died,  most  of  them  civilians  unable  to  defend 
themselves . 

These  add  up  to  a  systematic  attempt  to  exterminate 
one  nation.  That  is  my  personal  conclusion.  A  sizable  body 
of  data  has  beern  collected  by  human  rights  organizations 
such  as  Helsinki  Watch.  And  the  US  Government  has  carried 
out  a  significant  effort  to  gather  data.  It  has  made  only  a 
portion  of  the  material  available  to  the  public.  But  such 
material  as  ours  and  other  governments  have  gathered  leads 
to  ah  overwhelming  and  clear  conclusion.  The  UN  Security 
Council  has  acknowledged  the  gravity  o£  the  crimes  by 
setting  up  the  first  war  crimes  tribunal  since  Nuremberg. 
Its  primary  assignment,  if  I  read  the  charter  correctly,  is 

(37) 


38 


to  investigate  charges  of  genocide.  This  assumes  the 
Security  Council  can  overcome  the  impasse  over  the 
appointment  of  a  prosecutor. 

Within  the  State  Department,  the  experts  have  also 
analyzed  the  pattern  of  atrocities  and  concluded  that  it  is 
genocide.  At  the  political  level,  however,  the  executive 
branch  is  still  wrestling  with  what  to  call  it.  It  recently 
came  up  with  an  awkward  and  I  think  inadequate  description: 
acts  of  genocide.  Up  to  now,  no  Western  government  has 
formally  determined  that  this  is  genocide  under  the  Genocide 
Convention. 

I  believe  that  defining  and  characterizing  the  event 
is  the  fundamental  starting  point  for  any  analysis. 

Legally,  genocide  under  the  international  convention 
is  the  attempt  to  eliminate  all  or  part  of  a  nation,  people, 
or  religious  group;  and  to  prevent  that  group  from 
reproducing.  Genocide  is  by  nature  a  continuing  event.  And 
this  genocide  is  a  continuing  event.  It  is  occurring  at  a 
lower,  less  dramatic  level  than  previously;  the  analysts  say 
that  some  of  the  worst  atrocities  were  curbed  after 
international  attention  was  focused  on  them.  But  genocide 
continues,  possibly  because  no  one  focuses  on  it  today. 

In  preparation  for  this  hearing,  I  contacted  several 
international  relief  agencies  with  staff  on  the  ground  in 
Bosnia  as  well  as  human  rights  investigators  and  came  up 
with  a  number  of  examples. 

--  Bosnian  Serbs  continue  to  operate  at  least  one  rape 
camp  in  eastern  Bosnia.  Bosnian  refugees  in  Europe  say  their 
daughters  and  relatives  aged  11  to  18  are  being  held  there 
and  sexually  abused. 

--  systematic  persecution  of  non-Serbs  continues  in 
Banja  Luka,  the  predominantly  Serb  city  in  northern  Bosnia. 
In  one  recent  week,  the  office  of  one  agency  reported  the 
rape  of  two  65 -year-old  women  in  the  nearby  town  of 
Gradiska;  an  attack  by  armed  men  on  an  elderly  couple  in 
Banja  Luka  in  which  an  80-year-old  woman  was  left  stripped 
naked;  the  beating  of  an  old  man  who  was  tortured  with 
burning  cigarettes  all  over  his  body;  and  the  arrest  of  the 
Muslim  mufti  or  religious  leader.  Muharem  Krzic,  an 
extraordinary  man,  the  leader  of  the  Muslim  SDA  party  who 
has  decided  to  stay  in  the  region  to  defend  the  rights  of 
his  fellow  non-Serbs,  was  seized  Sept.  11,  brutally  beaten 
and  kept  incommunicado,  then  released  on  Sept.  22. 

Nightly,  Serb  units  bomb  the  residences  of  several 
Muslims  and  Croats  to  intimidate  them  into  fleeing  their 
homes.  One  typical  case  was  that  of  "a  Muslim  woman  who  sits 
before  us  with  a  bloodied  face,"  the  source  said.  "Three 
armed  men  came  to  her  apartment  today  and  told  her  to  vacate 
her  apartment .  To  encourage  her  they  beat  her  severely  and 
kicked  her  in  the  face.  She  may  lose  an  eye  as  a  result  of 
this  attack .  " 

--  In  Janja,  Bijelina,  and  Doboj ,  Serb  authorities 
have  forced  thousands  of  non-Serbs  at  gunpoint  to  give  up 
their  homes,  their  property,  and  their  cash  and  then  to  flee 


39 


across  minefields  on  the  front  line  into  government 
territory.  This  happened  this  very  month. 

--In  camps  in  the  predominantly  Croat  region  known  as 
Herceg-Bosna,  guards  beat  prisoners  at  random  with  wooden 
bars,  fired  machine  guns  into  the  hangars  in  which  prisoners 
were  held,  and  beat  or  tortured  at  least  five  prisoners  to 
death  in  the  past  month. 

--  Dutch  soldiers  in  Central  Bosnia  reported  that 
Bosnian  Croat  (HVO)  forces,  after  attacking,  looting,  and 
burning  the  town  of  Grbavica,  played  soccer  with  the  severed 
head  of  a  victim.  "Eight  of  the  soldiers  were  dressed  in 
all-black  uniforms,"  the  report  of  the  agency  said.  "About 
200  civilians  were  also  in  attendance.  The  soldiers  were 
singing  patriotic  songs  and  marching.  They  carried  a 
[Bosnian]  flag  which  was  covered  in  blood."  The  Dutch  UN 
troops  "witnessed  the  head  being  kicked  on  the  ground  like  a 
football  and  being  displayed  for  the  crowd  to  see." 

--  Near  Banja  Luka,  a  Boston  Globe  reporting  team 
last  month  visited  the  village  of  Liskovac  just  hours  after 
Serb  paramilitary  forces  allegedly  mutilated  and  killed  five 
Muslims.  The  newspaper's  reporter,  Sally  Jacobs,  described 
two  of  the  victims.  "Emina  Turna's  body  was  found  lying 
behind  the  barn  where  she  had  died  of  a  single  bullet  to  her 
head.  Two  of  her  fingers  had  been  cut  off  and  her  face  was 
pocked  with  cigarette  burns.  So  much  blood  flowed  frcm  Almaz 
Turan's  body  that  by  late  Monday  afternoon  the  carpet 
remained  matted  and  moist.  Underneath  the  table  on  which  he 
was  found,  an  orange -handled  knife  lay  amidst  dozens  of 
bloodied  family  photographs." 

--  And  finally,  Sarajevo,  a  city  of  380,000  under 
siege.   No  citizen  can  enter  or  leave,  no  foreigner  for  that 
matter  except  aid  workers,  journalists,  UN  troops  and  the 
occasional  representative  of  a  foreign  government.  There  is 
no  commerce.  For  the  most  part,  there  have  been  no  public 
services  whatsoever.  The  average  person  has  lost  3  0  pounds. 
People  bake  their  bread  by  burning  their  carpets,  their 
furniture,  their  shoes.  Their  bread  if  they  have  it  consists 
of  mostly  animal  feed. 

The  suffering  I  have  sketchily  described  does  not 
consist  of  random  events  carried  out  by  uncontrolled  forces 
but  is  the  result  of  decisions  by  authorities  carried  out  by 
the  agents  of  those  authorities.  The  lack  of  international 
attention  to  them  is  to  be  regretted. 

The  war  in  Bosnia  provides  proof  that  the  American 
and  the  world  public,  just  by  focusing  their  attention,  can 
have  impact  en  events.   Media  reports  a  little  over  a  year 
age  led  directly  and  immediately  to  the  closure  of  several 
Serb  detention  camps,  and  the  windina  down  of  others. 


40 


Reports  about  rape  camps  and  systematic  rape  also  had  an 
impact,  and -some  but  not  all  the  camps  were  disbanded;  one 
fears  however  that  many  of  the  female  victims  were  executed. 

The  point  is  to  obtain  the  facts  and  publish  them. 
That  informs  the  Western  public,  and  it  puts  those 
responsible  on  notice  that  the  world  is  watching.  The 

reaction  of  Western  governments  however  has  been  muted  and 
confused.  At  the  time  of  my  report  on  the  detention  camps  in 
northern  Bosnia,  they  described  the  events  there,  I  would 
say,  mischaracterized  -them,  as  an  ancient  conflict  with  deep 
roots,  a  civil  war,  a  religious  war,  a  tribal  war.  It  was 
none  of  those  things;  it  was  a  war  of  aggression,  a  conquest 
using  genocide  as  a  means. 

Working  level  diplomats  at  the  State  Department, 
driven  by  the  conviction  that  gathering  the  facts  was  vital 
for  any  policy  that  would  follow  brought  pressure  on  their 
superiors  to  start  collecting  the  data.  Yet  top  officials 
were  slow  to  respond.  They  discouraged  Congressional  and 
non -governmental  delegations  from  going  to  the  scene;  they 
tried  to  shift  the  focus  away  from  the  events  on  the  ground. 
They  made  misleading  public  statements.  This  is  the  context 
in  which  a  group  of  young  and  able  diplomats  resigned  in 
protest  from  the  State  Department  over  the  past  year,  a 
phenmonenon  not  seen  for  two  decades . 

A  large  body  of  material  on  Serb  actions  and  the  more 
recent  ones  by  Bosnian  Croats  in  "Herceg  Bosna"  has  now  been 
gathered  and  analyzed.  Part  of  the  lack  of  understanding  in 
the  general  public  of  what  has  happened  may  arise  from  the 
fact  that  that  material  gathered  and  the  analysis  of  the 
patterns  remains  unpublished.   The  material  is  still 
classified,  and  I  would  like  to  suggest  today  it  should  be 
made  available  to  the  public. 

I  believe  you  are  interested  in  the  diplomatic 
process.  The  flaws  are  well  known.  The  process  supposedly 
was  established  on  the  framework  of  openly  stated  principles 
of  international  law  such  the  inviolability  of 
internationally  recognized  borders,  but  in  practice  has 
accepted  as  a  basis  the  violation  of  the  principles  of 
peaceful  change.  Operationally,  it  has  failed  to  seek 
recourse  to  the  use  of  force  or  when  it  was  available  make 
use  of  the  threat  to  achieve  diplomatic  aims  to  uphold  the 
stated  principles.  It  began  and  still  operates  on  the 
assumption  that  the  war  in  3osnia  is  a  civil  war  as  if  it 
were  among  equals. 

In  reality,  a  minority  of  the  population  with  powerful 
backing  from  outside  and  control  over  50  per  cent  of  the 
arms,  has  mounted  sieges  of  cities,  organized  camps,  and  set 
the  cattern  for  the  atrocities. 


41 


I  quote  a  senior  aid  worker  i  met  in  Sarajevo.  "This 
is  not  a  war.  This  is  a  slaughter." 

The  only  diplomacy  that  works  in  such  a  case  is 
coercive  diplomacy,  that  is,  diplomacy  with  clear  aims 
backed  up  by  the  threat  of  the  use  of  force.  But  this  has 
been  a  case  of  diplomacy  without  force. 

The  negotiators  accorded  equal  weight  to  an 
internationally  recognized  government  and  the  rebels 
carrying  out  the  mayhem  and  massacres  often  referred  to  by 
the  euphemism  "ethnic  cleansing."  They  even  accorded 
equality  to  a  rump  group,  the  Bosnian  croats  in  "Herceg - 
Bosna, "  whose  leadership  was  totally  devoid  of  any 
legitimacy.  The  essence  of  the  diplomatic  approach  was  to 
accept  the  partition  of  Bosnia,  the  goal  of  the  Serbs.  The 
Croats  in  "Herceg  Bosna"  and  Croatia  itself,  read  the  tea 
leaves  correctly  and  were  the  first  to  sign  onto  the  plan. 

Human  rights  finished  a  distant  second. 

Yet  I  might  observe  that  the  one  aspect  of  events  in 
the  Balkans  to  which  the  general  western  public  can  relate 
and  which  matters  for  the  long  term  stability  of  Europe  is 
human  rights.  It  was  to  my  mind  the  emphasis  on  human  rights 
in  the  Helsinki  accords,  the  slow,  steady  growth  of  demand 
in  the  Communist  world   for  Western  rights  that  ensured  a 
peaceful  end  to  the  Communist  era.  As  a  citizen,  I  hate  to 
think  that  this  very  successful  process  and  the  principles 
hammered  out  over  15  years  will  be  abandoned  without  any 
second  thoughts. 

All  along,  there  has  been  "been  an  unstated  but 
fundamental  contradiction  between  the  idea  of  trying  the 
individuals  responsible  for  the  atrocities  and  negotiating 
with  them.  At  some  point  the  decision  must  be  made  which  way 
to  go.  The  negotiators  have  pursued  the  course  that  not  only 
assumes  their  eventual  exoneration  but  in  fact  endorses 
their  goals,  namely  apartheid,  ethnic  separation. 

Far  from  curbing  "ethnic  cleansing, "  the  diplomatic 
process  in  fact  may  have  encouraged  it.  When  the  Vance-Owen 
plan  was  rejected  by  the  Bosnian  Serbs,  the  Herceg  Bosna 
Croats  decided  on  their  own  to  start  implementing  it.  They 
closed  the  roads  to  central  Bosnia  where  Muslims  are 
concentrated,  stopped  all  supplies  to  Sarajevo,  attacked 
villages  and  massacred  the  civilians  in  central  Bcsnia,  then 
rounded  up  the  Muslim  men  in  the  Mostar  region  and  set  up 
detention  camps. 

The  3osnian  government  forces  went  on  the  center- 
offensive  and  seized  big  sections  of  territory  as  they  tried 
to  clear  the  routes.  Now  there  are  examples  of  Muslim 
atrocities  as  well. 

For  the  western  politicians  who  one  year  age  said 


42 


there  was  a  civil  war,  well,  today  they  can  point  to  one. 
But  it  was  a  self-fulfilling  prophecy;  it  was  avoidable.  And 
now  as  the  new  camps  were  set  up  in  which  as  many  as  10,000 
people  were  held  in  subhuman  conditions,  the  negotiations 
continued  without  any  pause,  camps  or  no  camps.  It  is 
difficult  to  square  that  with  the  London  principles  of 
August  1992  which  created  the  negotiating  process.  I  am  not 
sure  whether  those  conducting  the  negotiations  consider  the 
impact  of  such  signals  to  the  parties  on  the  ground. 

But  in  a  sense  the  signals  had  been  given  a  long  time 
earlier.  Sarajevo,  a  city  of  380,000  men,  women,  and 
children,  has  been  under  siege  for  18  months.  Despite  the 
circumlocutions  of  UN  spokesmen,  the  siege  continues.  The 
negotiations  go  on  oblivious  of  this  fact. 

From  a  journalist's  point  of  view,  the  diplomatic 
process  is  difficult  to  report.  No  single  government 
oversees  the  process  or  if  there  is  one,  it  doesn't  report 
to  the  public.  There  is  no  Congressional  oversight.  If  there 
is  a  major  development,  reporters  get  no  briefings.  It  is 
unlike  anything  I  have  covered.  It  has  every  appearance  of 
duress . 

A  quote  from  Lord  Owen  during  a  recent  BBC  Panorama 
production  may  give  insight  into  the  method  of  negotiation. 
First,  Radovan  Karadzic  was  on  camera  saying  that  the  latest 
Serb  map  gave  Muslims  30  per  cent  of  the  territory,  whereas 
Lord  Owen  thought  it  was  only  22  per  cent.  "We  bet  whiskey," 
said  Mr.  Karadzic.  They  had  indeed. 

Lord  Owen  confirmed  that  that  had  been  the  bet. 

"At  one  stage  I  must  say  we  took  a  bet.  I  didn't  think 
his  figures  --he  claimed  they  were  28  per  cent  and  I  said 
they  were  nearer  24  --we  settled  on  26.1,  so  I  lost  a 
bottle  of  whisky  on  point  one  per  cent.  But  he  never 
produced  the  map  on  which  the  cartographer  had  done  it,  and 
I,  to  this  day... as  far  as  I  was  concerned,  that  didn't 
worry  me.  What  I  got  was  a  commitment  to  26  per  cent  on  a 
specific  map  in  front  of  Milosevic,  therefore  it's  hard  to 
go  back  on  it,  and  therefore  Milosevic  was  able  to  say  well 
you  can  make  up  that  extra,  that's  two  per  cent  extra  from 
the  Serbs  and  two  per  cent  from  the  Croats  and  you've  got  3  0 
per  cent . " 

You  can  see  why  it  is  hard  for  a  reporter  to  cover. 

I  think  no  one  will  deny  that  the  current  plan  is  one 
that  gives  an  international  seal  of  approval  to  the 
establishment  of  state  entities  based  on  a  principle  of 
ethnic  purity.   It  was  drafted  by  the  Serbs,  the  Bosnian 
Serbs  and  President  Slobodan  Milosevic  of  Serbia,  with 
support  of  Croats,  the  Heroeg  Bosna  group  with  the  backing 
of  President  Franjc  Cud-mar.  of  Croatia,  to  carve  uc  an 


43 


integrated,  interlinked  region,  a  melting  pot  republic.  In 
cities  such  as  Sarajevo,  Banja  Luka  and  Mostar,  the  rate  of 
inter-ethnic  marriage  was  3  0  to  3  5  per  cent.  What  is  to 
happen  to  the  mixed  marriages  and  to  the  children  of  mixed 
marriages?  It  looks  like  this  will  divide  Sarajevo  as  well: 
Sarajevo,  the  haven  of  tolerance  for  centuries  for 
Catholics,  Orthodox,  Muslims,  and  Jews. 

One  cannot  predict  whether  the  carve-up  will  end  the 
fighting  or  usher  in  a  new  phase.  Those  on  the  ground  who 
have  watched  this  closely  believe  it  will  have  vast 
implications  for  the  suffering  civilians. 

There  are  still  many  non-Serbs  in  northern  Bosnia,  the 
so-called  Bosnian  Krajina.  The  International  Red  Cross 
thinks  there  could  be  as  many  as  100,000  of  the  580,000  who 
had  been  there  before  the  war.  Relief  agencies  expect  they 
will  be  expelled  as  the  fulfillment  of  the  plan.  They 
anticipate  mass  expulsions  in  all  directions. 

So  the  negotiated  settlement  may  complete  the  "ethnic 
cleansing. " 

I  tried  to  find  out  on  the  eve  of  this  hearing  where 
it  is  that  NATO  troops  are  to  be  stationed  in  Bosnia  to 
implement  the  settlement.  The  spokesman  for  Lord  Owen  and  Mr 
Stoltenberg  could  not  tell  me.  Nor  could  he  tell  me  whether 
it  will  be  NATO's  responsibility  to  disarm  one  or  all  the 
parties  or  whether  it  will  have  the  function  to  provide 
protection  to  the  endangered  non-Serb  minorities  in  north 
Bosnia  and  if  so  how. 

I  conclude  by  welcoming  your  interest .  You  can 
understand  if  I,  as  a  beat  reporter  who  in  a  sense  covers 
this  committee,  refrain  from  offering  policy  prescriptions. 
I  instead  wish  to  state  the  obvious:  it  is  essential  to 
understand  and  agree  upon  the  nature  of  what  has  happened. 
It  is  essential  to  inform  the  public  with  a  full  disclosure 
of  the  facts  that  have  been  gathered  and  the  analysis  of 
those  facts;  and  whatever  objective  you  may  choose  as  a 
result  of  that  airing  of  facts  and  analysis,  it  is  incumbent 
upon  you  in  the  government  to  relate  the  means  to  that  end. 


44 

Jeane  J.  Kirkpatrick 

Leavey  Professor  of  Government,  Georgetown  University 

Senior  Fellow,  American  Enterprise  Institute 

TESTIMONY  BEFORE  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS 
UNITED  STATES  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 


on 


29  September  1993 


Mr.  Chairman  and  members  of  the  Committee,  thank  you  for  giving  me  the 
opportunity  to  share  my  thoughts  on  the  recent  developments  in  Bosnia,  including  the 
Clinton  Administration's  proposal  that  thousands  of  U.S.  troops  take  part  in  a  massive 
"peacekeeping"  effort. 

Several  issues  of  special  concern  to  me  are  present  in  the  proposed  plan  for 
peacekeeping  in  Bosnia.    I  ask  myself: 

1.  Will  this  "peacekeeping"  do  justice  to  basic  issues  concerning  the  use  of 
force,  and  respect  for  territorial  integrity?  or  will  simply  involve  Americans 
in  enforcing  an  unjust  peace? 

2.  Is  it  consistent  with  the  responsibilities  of  the  U.S.  government  to  U.S. 
armed  forces?  Or  will  it  put  American  forces  in  harm's  way,  under  foreign 
command  and  under  rules  of  engagement  which  do  not  permit  their 
effective  defense? 


45 


3.  Will  this  policy  have  a  reasonable,  containable  cost,  born  equitably  among 
NATO  members  and  other  participants?  Will  it  "count"  toward  U.S.  payment 
of  U.N.  peacekeeping  costs?  Or  will  the  U.S.  accept  the  Secretary 
General's  insistence  that,  if  NATO  commands,  NATO  not  the  U.N.  pays. 

4.  When  and  how  will  it  end? 

5.  Will  the  "peacekeeping"  approach  actually  contribute  to  peace  in  Central 
Europe  in  the  long  run,  or  will  it,  by  accepting  territorial  conquest,  invite 
further  aggression? 

I  would  like  to  comment  on  each  of  these  issues,  saving  the  first  for  last.  I 
understand  that  my  information  is  incomplete. 

Traditional  U.N.  "peacekeeping"  operations  have  some  special  characteristics. 
They  are  set  up  with  the  consent  of  the  parties;  they  are  neutral  as  between  the  parties 
to  a  conflict  and  they  use  minimum  force  in  the  performance  of  their  tasks.  They  are 
carried  out  under  U.N.  supervision.  And  they  tend  to  last  forever. 

These  characteristics  will  not  be  present  in  Bosnia. 

Peacekeeping  in  Bosnia  could  not  be  said  to  rest  on  consent  of  the  parties. 
Moreover,  in  this  instance,  there  is  no  real  peace  to  keep,  every  ceasefire  to  date  has 
been  violated,  and  there  is  every  reason  to  think  this  pattern  will  continue. 

Moreover,  the  United  States  will  be  put  in  the  position  of  enforcing  an  unjust 
agreement.  A  sovereign  nation,  Bosnia,  is  being  forced  to  sign  on  to  an  agreement  that 
violates  its  most  basic  interests.  As  Britain  and  France  coerced  the  leaders  of  the 
Czechoslovakia  to  submit  to  a  deal  at  Munich  in  1938,  so  too  have  Western  powers 
helped  impose  a  deal  on  the  Bosnians. 

This  peacekeeping  plan  will  in  fact  police  an  agreement  which  rewards  aggression. 
This  also  resembles  1938.  And  what  happened  then?  The  aggressor-Nazi  Germany- 
was  not  pacified,  not  satisfied  with  the  part  of  Czechoslovakia  it  was  awarded  at  Munich, 
and  continued  the  aggression.  While  not  as  powerful  as  Nazi  Germany,  there  is  every 
indication  that  Serbia  will  continue  in  its  expansionist  and  genocidal  policies  much 
as  Germany  did  55  years  ago. 

As  I  understand  it,  the  Clinton  Administration  is  proposing  to  take  part  in  p  ~essive 
peacekeeping  operation  consisting  of  some  50,000  NATO  troops  to  be  deployed  in 
Bosnia  immediately  upon  the  conclusion  of  an  agreement  between  the  warring  parties. 

American  troops  would  likely  be  placed  in  the  southeastern  part  of  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina,  primarily  in  and  around  the  cities  of  Sarajevo,  Mostar,  and  Goradze-that  is, 


46 


American  troops  will  be  placed  in  the  areas  of  most  intense  conflict.  Methods  of 
deployment  being  discussed  include  delivery  of  troops  by  sea  via  the  Croatian  ports  of 
Split  and  Ploce  or  by  rail  through  Serbia  and  perhaps  Belgrade. 

What  will  the  actual  cost  of  the  operation  be  to  the  United  States,  the  contributions 
of  others,  and  the  duration?  It  has  been  estimated  that  the  cost  of  this  operation  would 
be  around  $4  billion  per  year,  with  the  United  States  providing  half  the  personnel  and  half 
the  money,  which  is  to  say  25,000  troops  at  the  cost  of  $2  billion  annually. 
The  Clinton  Administration  insists  that  contributions  from  NATO  countries  and  other  allies 
be  pledged  as  a  prerequisite  for  American  involvement.  Do  other  NATO  members  agree? 
Will  the  struggle  of  getting  contributions  seen  in  Operations  Desert  Shield  and  Desert 
Storm  be  repeated?  Will  other  nations  pay  a  fair  share  as  costs  spiral?  From  what  part 
of  the  U.S.  budget  will  American  contributions  come?  Since  it  is  imperative  that  the 
Defense  Department's  finite  resources  not  be  raided  for  this  large  undertaking,  will  the 
Administration  seek  special  appropriations? 

What  will  be  the  duration  of  American  participation  in  this  operation?  The  process 
of  deployment  itself  is  said  to  be  a  lengthy  logistical  task.  U.N.  peacekeeping  operations 
often  last  for  many  years.   Will  this  one  drag  for  a  decade  at  truly  inestimable  costs? 

What  will  be  the  rules  of  engagement  for  Amer  ican  troops  in  Bosnia?  And  who  will 
determine  them?  President  Clinton  and  the  Permanent  U.S.  Representative  to  the  United 
Nations,  Madeleine  Albright,  have  tried  to  allay  fears  about  the  terms  under  which 
American  troops  would  be  placed  in  harm's  way  to  police  in  the  no  man's  lands  of 
Bosnia.  Obviously,  standard  U.N.  peacekeeping  guidelines  of  shoot-only-when-shot-at 
are  not  appropriate  here.  But  what  will  the  rules  of  engagement  be  in  an  operation 
conducted  by  NATO  but  authorized  by  the  United  Nations?  These  rules  should  be 
determined  by  the  U.S.  and  NATO  —  not  the  U.N.  Secretariat  —  and  should  be  clearly 
defined  in  advance,  or  many  lives  could  be  needlessly  lost.  But  these  are  no  precedents 
--  only  claims. 

The  discussion  of  a  U.N.  peacekeeping  operation  implemented  by  NATO  raises 
the  key  questions  of  command  and  control.  The  administration  has  sought  in  recent 
days  to  assure  critics  that  large  peacekeeping  operations  Americans  would  be 
commanded  by  American  officers  answering  to  American  civilian  political  leaders.  But  the 
Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations  has  consistently  claimed  the  role  of  commander- 
in-chief  for  U.N.  peacekeeping  forces  and  has  said  that  NATO  peacekeepers  should 
answer  to  him.  Moreover,  the  British  and  French  governments  have  apparently 
supported  his  positions.  While  the  administration  app^-s  to  be  ensuring  sovereign 
control  over  our  troops,  no  ambiguity  should  be  permitted  on  this  question  of  command 
and  control. 


47 


The  Other  Path:  Better  Late  Than  Never 

There  is  another  path  which  some  of  us  have  recommended  for  a  year  and  a  half. 
It  resembles  the  plan  advocated  by  the  U.S.  president  when  he  was  a  candidate. 

The  First  Step: 

I  believe  the  United  States  should  lead  the  way  in  lifting  the  arms  embargo  which 
freezes  in  place  asymmetrical  advantages  for  Serbia.  The  Bosnians  must  be  permitted 
to  defend  themselves-a  right  not  granted  by  the  U.N.  Charter,  but  recognized  by  Article 
51  it  as  inherent  to  nation-states.  Make  no  mistake,  Bosnia  js  a  sovereign  nation-state, 
a  member  of  the  United  Nations.  In  leading  the  way  to  lift  the  arms  embargo,  the  United 
States  should  remind  the  world  that  the  embargo  was  applied  to  a  state  that  no  longer 
exists  -  namely,  greater  Yugoslavia,  and  not  to  Bosnia.  The  United  States  should  assert 
a  leadership.  The  Clinton  Administration  has  in  the  case  of  Bosnia  interpreted 
"consultation"  with  allies  to  mean  that  the  U.S.  should  seek  permission  from  its  allies  to 
act,  and  lacking  their  approval  should  not  act.  I  believe  the  U.S.  should  consult  with  the 
European  allies  about  the  policy  of  lifting  an  arms  embargo  which  it  will  pursue  --  with  or 
without  them. 

The  Second  Step: 

Then  the  United  States  should  act  to  arm  the  Bosnian  Muslims.  The  Hyde 
Amendment  would  make  arming  the  Bosnian  Muslims  American  policy.  It  should  be 
passed.  This  action  may  need  to  be  unilateral,  but  it  is  clearly  permissible  under 
international  law.  Under  Article  51  of  the  U.N.  Charter,  nations  can  act  to  provide  for  their 
collective  self-defense.  The  U.S.,  if  it  must,  can  -  alone  -  help  the  Bosnians  defend 
themselves. 

Unfortunately,  the  Clinton  Administration  has  so  far  been  unwilling  to  act 
unilaterally.  In  a  speech  last  Thursday,  National  Security  Adviser  to  the  President, 
Anthony  Lake,  said  of  American  action  regarding  Bosnia:  "while  we  have  clear  reasons 
to  engage  and  persist. ..they  do  not  justify  the  extreme  costs  of  taking  unilateral 
responsibility  for  imposing  a  solution." 

With  all  due  respect,  I  disagree  with  Dr.  Lake.  A  superpower  has  an  impact  when 
it  fails  to  act  as  well  as  when  it  acts.  The  U.S.  is  already  involved  in  "imposing  a  solution," 
to  use  Lake's  words,  but,  alas,  it  is  an  unjust  one.  And  the  "extreme  costs"  --  moral, 
political  and  eventually,  military  --  lie  in  not  helping  the  Q~snian  Muslims.  If  the  U.N.  and 
the  Europeans  will  not  let  the  victims  of  aggression  and  ethnic  cleansing  defend 
themselves,  then  as  the  world's  only  remaining  superpower,  the  United  States  should. 


48 


It  is  not  a  futile  policy.  The  Bosnian  Muslims  have  shown  some  military  strength 
in  the  field,  notably  in  clashes  with  Croatian  militiamen  in  recent  days  near  Mostar  and 
Vrtez. 

Reports  of  recent  military  activity  of  the  Bosnian  Muslims  on  the  ground 
demonstrate  their  viability. 

They  have  captured  parts  of  Medved,  "a  Strategic  highland  area  just  outside 
Mostar  that  is  within  artillery  range"  of  Siroki  Brijeg,  a  Croatian  stronghold. 
They  have  also  had  some  successes  in  securing  positions  near  the  Bosnian 
town  of  Bugojno.   (New  York  Times  9/20/93.) 

They  have  launched  an  offensive  against  Croat  forces  who  threaten  the 
highway  linking  Mostar  with  Muslim-controlled  central  Bosnia.  (New  York 
Times  9/16/93.) 

According  to  U.N.  and  E.C.  monitors,  the  Bosnian  army  "has  nearly  doubled 
the  territory  under  its  undisputed  authority  and  virtually  reversed  the 
proportion  of  Bosnia  held  by  Muslims  and  Croats." 

Now  they  control  the  "once  ethnically  mixed  towns  of  Travnik,  Kakanj, 
Fojnica,  Bugojno,  and  most  of  Gornji  Vakof." 

They  have  taken  1410  square  miles  of  land  previously  controlled  by 
Croat  forces. 

A  Muslim  military  offensive  has  left  a  number  of  isolated  Croat 
enclaves  inside  Muslim-held  territory  (e.g.  in  Vares,  Busovaca,  and 
Kiseljak). 

On  July  2nd,  they  launched  a  preemptive  strike  against  Croat  forces 
in  the  town  of  Zenica.  Within  two  weeks  the  Bosnian  army  had 
driven  out  the  militia  and  all  but  200  of  the  town's  6,600  Croats. 
(Washington  Post  9/12/93.) 

The  argument  that  the  United  States  and  the  West  would  only  fuel  the  carnage  in 
the  Balkans  if  it  helped  Bosnians  procure  weapons  is  a  mistake. 

The  Third  Step: 

The  final  element  of  the  other  path  would  involve  American  airpower.  Evidence  so 
far  indicates  that  the  Serbian  government  understands  only  the  language  of  force.  With 
little  risk,  and  less  cost,  the  United  States  could  use  its  superior  technological  power  to 
great  advantage.   It  could  lift  sieges,  interrupt  the  flow  of  arms,  fuel,  and  food  to  Serbian 


49 


forces.      Moreover,  the  U.S.  can  play  a  vital  part  in  the  Bosnians'  self-defense  by 
providing  air  cover. 

There  are,  of  course,  stable,  well-defined,  "high-contrast"  targets  in  Serbia  to  bomb. 
Battle  tanks  and  field  artillery  pieces  shelling  Sarajevo  can  be  found  and  taken  out  by 
American  aircraft.  The  assertion  that  the  ground  forces  in  Yugoslavia  are  elusive  and 
hence  hard  to  target  are  overstated. 

I  believe  there  are  three  alternatives  for  American  policy.  First,  we  can  continue 
to  do  nothing,  trying  not  to  notice  the  slaughter  in  Bosnia. 

Second,  we  can  distinguish  between  aggressors  and  victims,  remove  the  arms 
embargo,  help  Bosnians  secure  arms,  and  use  U.S.  airpower  to  assist  them. 

Third,  we  can  pursue  the  plan  the  Clinton  Administration  is  now  proposing  -  which 
requires  the  introduction  of  2500  U.S.  ground  troops  in  the  Balkans. 

This  is  the  worst  alternative. 

The  mission  of  these  "peacekeeping"  troops  would  be  to  enforce  an  unjust 
agreement  imposed  by  force  on  the  Bosnian  Muslims,  "agreed"  to  only  under  extreme 
duress  to  prevent  death  by  starvation  or  exposure  of  many  thousands  of  Bosnians  during 
the  coming  winter. 

It  is  bad  enough  that  the  United  States  and  other  Western  governments  have 
stood  by  passively  in  response  to  Serbian  sponsored  aggression  against  Croatia  and 
Bosnia.  To  assign  American  troops  to  enforce  a  settlement  based  on  aggression,  ethnic 
cleansing,  rape,  starvation,  mass  murder  is  nearly  unthinkable. 

The  use  of  American  force  to  enforce  borders  of  the  "new"  Bosnia  would  not  be 
acceptable  to  the  consciences  of  many  Americans.  We  know  how  those  borders  came 
to  be.  We  have  watched  the  long  brutal  violation  of  law,  morality  and  the  U.N.  Charter 
which  clearly  forbids  "the  threat  or  use  of  force  against  the  territorial  integrity  or  political 
independence  of  any  state,  or  in  any  other  manner  inconsistent  with  the  Purposes  of  the 
United  Nations." 

The  proposed  peacekeeping  operation  will  be  expensive  and  ineffective. 

It  will  leave  in  place  *u3  government  and  the  leaders  who  sponsored  and 
conducted  aggression.  It  will  preserve  the  unequal  balance  of  force  which  enabled 
Serbians  to  conquer  territory  and  people  in  Croatia  and  Bosnia. 

U.N.  peacekeeping  forces  will  be  seen  as  a  symbol  of  international  acceptance  of 
violence  and  conquest.   As  such,  they  can  only  encourage  other  potential  aggressors. 


50 


Not  only  would  such  a  peacekeeping  operation  enforce  an  unjust  peace,  but  it 
would  be  more  dangerous  and  more  costly  than  the  other  path.  The  other  path  does  not 
require  putting  some  25,000  American  troops  in  harm's  way  on  the  ground  in  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina,  to  save  as  lightning  rod,  inviting  attack.  American  troops  do  not  resemble 
the  professional  neutral  peacekeepers  of  Northern  Europe.  They  have  been  trained  to 
serve  as  partisans  for  freedom.  They  will  inevitably  be  attractive  targets  to  Serbian 
leaders  and  other  enemies  of  self-determination  in  the  region. 

Even  the  proposed  path  of  deployment  is  dangerous.  Sending  Americans  through 
Serbia  by  rail  invites  trouble.   Deployment  by  sea  into  Croatia  also  may  not  be  safe. 

Lifting  the  arms  embargo,  helping  Bosnians  secure  arms,  using  air  power,  is  less 
dangerous  because  it  does  not  involve  thousands  of  ground  troops.  The  Clinton 
Administration  has  agonized  long  over  the  anguish  of  Bosnia.  In  a  list  of  foreign 
"accomplishments"  identified  in  his  Thursday  speech,  Anthony  Lake  said  "We  have 
struggled  with  the  complex  tragedy  in  Bosnia."    Struggling  is  not  enough. 

Judging  the  Clinton  Plan  by  the  Administration's  Own  Standards 

Fears  of  senior  Clinton  Administration  officials  about  the  drawbacks  of  not 
participating  in  this  "peacekeeping"  operation  have  been  reported  in  the  press  in  recent 
days.  If  these  reports  are  accurate,  they  fear  that  without  American  involvement  in  a 
major  peace  enforcement  effort  the  killing  will  continue  in  the  Balkans,  more  refugees  will 
be  displaced  from  Bosnia,  the  conflict  might  spill  over  into  new  regions  (like  Macedonia 
and  Kosovo),  and  relations  with  Muslim  countries  will  suffer.  But  just  any  action  will  not 
help. 

I  believe  the  actions  the  Clinton  Administration  now  proposes  will  bring  about  the 
outcomes  they  seek  to  avoid. 

In  recent  days  the  Clinton  Administration  has  articulated  new  criteria  for  U.S. 
participation  in  peacekeeping: 

that  Congress  approve  of  the  mission  initially  and  periodically  thereafter; 

that  the  belligerents  demonstrate  "seriousness"  in  pursuing  peace; 

that  these  warring  parties  freely  invite  peacekeepers  and  American  forces  onto 
thr'   woil  to  police  a  ceasefire; 

that  NATO  members  and  other  nations  agree  to  share  the  financial  burden  and 
contribute  substantial  numbers  of  troops  to  the  operation;  and 


51 


-  that  a  clear  "exit  strategy"  is  enunciated  for  removing  American  peacekeepers 
under  scenarios  of  success  (the  establishment  of  a  robust  peace)  or  failure  (the 
recognition  of  open  warfare). 

I  believe  the  proposed  policy  fails  to  satisfy  several  of  these  criteria.  There  are  no 
grounds  to  think  that  the  aggressors  of  the  past  will  relinquish  their  expansionist  and 
genocidal  policies.  Why  should  we  imagine  that  a  peace  which  rewards  Serbia  and  their 
Bosnian  Serb  collaborators  by  letting  them  keep  territory  won  by  aggression  will  convince 
them  to  stop  now? 

The  plan  to  send  American  troops  to  act  as  peacekeepers  also  fails  the  test  of  an 
"exit  strategy."  Will  peace  ever  be  established  so  securely  that  the  Americans  can  come 
home?  And  if  so,  when?  If,  as  is  likely,  the  peacekeeping  operation  proves  to  be  a 
costly  failure  rather  than  success,  how  and  when  will  American  troops  be  removed?  Will 
not  American  credibility  be  severely  damaged  if  we  withdraw  in  failure?  Without  a  clear 
definition  of  victory  in  the  style  of  a  more  traditional  military  intervention,  without  a  clear 
purpose,  without  clear  national  interests,  an  "exit  strategy"  will  remain  murky.  Without 
arms  for  Bosnia  and  a  better  balance  of  forces,  there  is  no  exit  strategy. 

I  urge  the  Congress  to  lift  the  arms  embargo,  give  arms  and  assistance  to  the 
Bosnians,  use  American  airpower  to  punish  aggressors  and  end  ethnic  cleansing. 


52 


THE    WOODROW    WILSON    CENTER 


EAST  EUROPEAN  STUDIES 


MAKING  THE  CASE  FOR  UNITED  STATES  TROOPS  IN  BOSNIA  HERZEGOVINA 

Testimony  before  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 
September  29,  1993 


John  R.  Lampe 

Director,  East  European  Studies 

Woodrow  Wilson  International  Center  for  Scholars* 


A  last  window  of  opportunity  may  yet  open  in  the  war  over  Bosnia  Herzegovina.  This 
window  does  not  bring  the  clean,  fresh  air  of  a  guaranteed  settlement  among  fully  responsible 
leaders  representing  only  their  war-weary  populations.  In  Croatia  as  well  as  Serbia,  only 
ineffectively  divided  oppositions  represent  the  war- weary  majority.  But  this  open  window  does 
bring  the  cold  air  of  winter  to  help  discourage  the  continuation  of  hostilities.  If  this  war 
continues  now  or  resumes  next  spring,  it  will  surely  cost  many  more  thousands  of  lives  and 
surely  spread  beyond  the  Bosnian  border,  most  likely  to  Kosovo,  Macedonia  and  beyond.  Such 
a  wider  conflict  would  make  the  Bosnian  war's  threat  to  European  security  and  to  the  democratic 
transition  in  Southeastern  Europe,  both  vital  United  States  interests,  too  clear  too  late. 

The  presently  proposed  partition  of  Bosnia  Herzegovina  is  hardly  attractive  in  itself.  By 
Western  standards  of  human  rights,  it  does  not  measure  up  to  the  original  Vance-Owen  plan, 
with  its  minority  rights  both  for  political  representation  and  for  refugees'  returning  to 
dispossessed  property  in  each  of  its  10  provinces.  Never  mind  that  spilled  milk,  and  the  initial 
American  reluctance  to  support  the  plan  and  the  peace-keeping  force  of  50,000  Western  troops 
that  was  deemed  necessary,  then  as  now,  to  enforce  it.  That  was  early  February;  this  is  late 
September. 

The  Clinton  Administration  has  rightly  encouraged  the  Bosnian  government  of  Alija 
Izetbegovic  to  drive  the  hardest,  least  bad  bargain  that  it  could  with  the  Bosnian  Serb  and  Croat 
regimes.  This  summer,  however,  largely  out  of  Western  sight,  Bosnian  Muslim  forces  went 
beyond  bargaining  to  conduct  a  considerable  offensive  in  central  Bosnia  against  the  Croatian 
HVO,  pressing  west  and  south  toward  Mostar.  David  Ottoway's  article  in  the  Washington  Post 
of  September  12  offers  an  account  of  the  ethnic  cleansing  of  Croats  that  was  involved,  an 
account  worth  mentioning  here  as  a  cautionary  tale  for  advocates  of  lifting  the  arms'  embargo 
and  as  counterpoint  to  the  numerous  accounts  of  recent  Croatian  cleansing  of  Muslims,  the  siege 
of  Mostar,  and  maltreatment  of  war  prisoners  on  their  side  of  the  line.    Add  the  continuing 


The  views  expressed  here  by  Dr.  Lampe  are  his  own  and  do  not  reflect  those  of  the  Woodrow  Wilson 
Center,  which  does  not  take  political  positions. 


53 


barbarism  of  the  Bosnian  Serbs'  bombardment  of  Sarajevo,  as  well  as  their  initial  responsibility, 
shared  with  Slobodan  Milosevic,  for  starting  the  Bosnian  war,  stir  in  the  entry  from  the  start  of 
troops  from  Croatia  into  Herzegovina,  and  what  set  of  forces  do  you  have?  Ones  that  have 
shown  no  signs  of  being  able  to  observe  a  cease-fire,  let  alone  a  settlement,  by  themselves. 
Bosnian  government  representatives  in  particular  have  long  insisted  that  only  the  presence  of  a 
sizeable  contingent  of  Western  troops  on  the  ground,  with  the  United  States  in  the  lead,  can 
enforce  any  settlement  and  then  only  under  aggressive  rules  of  engagement. 

Exit  any  reconstituted  UNPROFOR  arrangement  and  its  passive  rules  of  engagement,  and 
enter  an  American-led  NATO  force  that  offers  the  only  hope  for  establishing  peace  long  enough 
for  pressure  for  more  reasonable  politics  and  the  return  of  economic  rationality  to  assert  itself. 
The  administration's  detailed  plan  for  just  such  a  presence  has  now  come  forward,  but  with  a 
set  of  qualifications  that  makes  observers  wonder  whether  it  is  intended  only  to  promise  an 
enforced  settlement  without  the  likelihood  that  any  troops  will  actually  be  dispatched  or  paid  for. 
Among  the  qualifications  for  "getting  in"  that  I  find  most  troubling  is  the  indeterminate  period 
for  observing  that  all  sides  are  not  only  observing  a  cease-fire  but  also  pulling  back  both  troops 
and  heavy  weapons.  Their  leaders  cannot,  I  fear,  trust  or  compel  local  commanders  to  do  this 
on  their  own. 

What  about  the  risk  of  United  States  troops  facing  an  escalating  series  of  Somalia-like 
skirmishes  and  then  having  no  predictable  way  of  getting  out?  Although  the  various  armies  and 
militias  in  Bosnia  Herzegovina  are  neither  well  trained  nor  tightly  disciplined,  they  are  still 
sufficiently  concentrated  and  controlled  to  be  far  more  vulnerable  to  the  striking  power  of  United 
States  troops  and  technology,  including  air  power,  than  the  scattered  urban  guerrillas  of  Somali 
warlords.  And  the  troops  as  well  as  the  commanders  of  the  assorted  Bosnian  forces,  the  Serbs 
in  particular,  know  it,  several  sources  have  assured  me. 

"Getting  out"  is  another  matter.  An  open-ended  commitment  to  turn  Bosnia  Herzegovina 
into  a  NATO  mandate  or  trust  territory  of  course  asks  too  much.  The  administration  speaks  of 
staying  for  at  least  one  year.  Let  me  propose  one  year  with  mandated  consideration  of  renewal 
for  another  year.  That  potential  renewal  seems  to  me  a  significantly  better  guarantee  that  a 
lasting,  wider  accommodation,  from  Croatia  to  Macedonia,  can  be  reached  than  does  Senator 
Nunn's  proposal  for  "exit  and  lift".  Promising  to  lift  the  arms'  embargo  on  the  Bosnian 
Muslims  as  a  farewell  gesture  if  the  impending  settlement  fails  unfortunately  gives  those  Muslim 
commanders  not  under  direct  control  by  the  Bosnian  government,  an  incentive  to  violate  the 
settlement  in  order  to  gain  access  to  more  arms.  (We  should  not  underestimate  the  weaponry  and 
supplies  they  currently  receive).  Such  a  stipulation  would  tempt  Serb  and  Croat  commanders 
to  strike  first  before  Muslim  forces  could  receive  or  deploy  new  arms.  It  would  also  discourage 
them  from  accepting  the  NATO  force  as  a  guarantor  of  equal  accountability  for  all  sides  in 
observing  the  terms  of  settlement  and  paying  a  "fair",  that  is  a  strict  and  severe  price  for  any 
violation.  The  proposed  concentration  of  United  States  forces  in  Sarajevo.  Mostar  and  Gorazde 
affords  the  largely  urban  Muslim  population  who  are  the  principal  victims  of  this  war  an  overdue 
guarantee  of  safety  in  any  case. 


54 


Finally,  how  can  the  Congress  and  the  administration  assure  the  American  people  that 
the  Tudjman  government  in  Zagreb  and  the  Milosevic  government  in  Belgrade  will  not  only  do 
all  they  can  to  insure  the  observance  of  peace  terms  in  Bosnia  but  also  avoid  the  temptation  to 
resume  the  1991  war  for  Croatian  territory  of  Serb  or  formerly  mixed  population?  If  the 
Croatian  government  wishes  to  avoid  some  version  of  the  economic  sanctions  imposed  on  Serbia 
in  1992,  it  should  reverse  its  recent  decision  to  deny  the  renewal  of  the  UNPROFOR  mandate 
to  keep  peace  in  the  contested  areas  of  Croatia.  In  fact,  that  government  might  do  better  to  seek 
again  to  negotiate  terms  for  a  settlement  with  Serbia,  a  process  the  United  States  government 
should  encourage. 

How  can  we  "encourage"  the  Serbian  government  of  Slobodan  Milosevic  to  comply? 
Only  by  weakening  the  public  support  that  clumsy  and  needlessly  comprehensive  sanctions  have 
generated  for  Milosevic  and  still  worse  for  Vojislav  Seselj.  August  public  opinion  polls  show 
such  support  now  rising  in  Belgrade  and  the  other  cities  whose  living  standards  have  been 
devastated  by  the  sanctions.  Their  populations  are  reversing  their  previous  opposition  to  old 
Communists  and  new  nationalists.  Let  us  lift  requirements  for  the  always  delayed  or  denied 
permissions  for  food  and  medicine,  and  for  all  raw  materials  or  equipment  connected  thereto, 
requirements  that  have  made  a  mockery  of  the  supposed  exemption  of  food  and  medicine.  (See 
Henry  Kamm's  August  23  article  in  the  International  Herald  Tribune  on  the  grim  medical 
consequences).  The  promise  of  lifting  all  sanctions  could  then  be  used  to  insure  Serbian 
compliance  with  a  Bosnian  settlement  and  also  good  faith  negotiations  with  Croatia  and,  lest  we 
forget,  with  the  Albanian  population  of  Kosovo.  If  such  dealings  were  beyond  the  capacity  of 
the  Milosevic  regime,  so  much  the  better.  Let  us  then  deal  with  the  alternative  regime  that  will 
be  needed  in  any  case  to  restore  Serbia's  honorable  place  as  a  European  state  and  nation. 


55 


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56 


The  »*smiwctow  Post 


Bosnian  Muslims'  Gains  May  Have  High  Cost 


By  David  R  Ul  10*  ay 


FOJNICA.  Uoaiua-IVianias  Mm- 
lira  led  irmy  has  made  major  Rims 
this  summer  m  expanding  and  f0"" 
sohdaling  us  cimtrul  over  central 
Bosnia  hi  animpation  of  establishing 
•  separate  Muslim  rrpul.lu 

But  in  military  successes  may 
have  come  at  the  expense  ol  the  ide- 
ili  (or  whvh  Bosnian  leaders  have 
Hid  Iher  were  fighting  this  lone. 
Moody  civil  war:  preservation  of  Ihe 
country's  mulii-ethmc  spirit  and 
character. 

The  heavy  coat  to  their  long-de- 
clared war  objective  is  written  sadly 
ados*  Ihe  (tuned  remains  nl  scores 
of  homes  and  a  lurmiure  factory  in 
this  Mile  crossroads  town.  Once  held 
up  lo  (he  world  by  Croats  and  Mus- 
Irms  as  a  model  ol  I  heir  successful 
power  sharing,  it  now  offers  only  an 
example  of  Muslim  "ethnic  clean- 
mf.' 

While  the  Western  media  have 
cancemrated  Ihcir  attention  on  Mus- 
ks) nrffermg  in  Sarajevo  and  more 
teeentlv  in  Mnstar.  Ihe  Bosnian  army 
has  tystematically  puslied  the  Croat 
population  out  of  many  ethnically 
mned  (owns  such  as  Fojnica  all 
across  Ihe  mdusm.il  heartland  of 
Bosnia 

Thratsands  nf  Croal  civilians  have 
fled  hecauar  llicir  lumirs  wrte  de- 
strnyrd  in  Ihe  ('gluing,  they  fraied 
Muslim  rriribaitSiiti  and  ink*,  or  Ihry 
were  ordered  l«  leave  liy  their  own 
retreating  prnicriors. 

Since  earli  June,  die  Bosnian 
aimv  has  nearly  doubled  Ihe  Icrri- 
iiiii  under  Ms  uiidisiwicd  aulhnriiy 
and  viiuallv  reversed  Ihe  proporlnn 
nf  flosma  held  by  Mualitna  and 
Cioals.  according  lo  U.N.  and  Eu- 
ropean Community  mnnitota. 

The  Muslims  have  moie  land  now 
than  Ihe  Crnaia.  perhaps  20  per- 
cent.' said  a  U  N  miluary  officer 
monitoring  the  fighting  in  central 
Bosnia. 

The  Bosnian  army  now  controls 
the  once  ethnically  mixed  towns  of 
Tiavnik.  Kakatu.  Finnic*.  Ilugojno 
and  most  pf  C.ninji  Vakuf  and  has 
pushed  southward  to  Moalar.  wliere 
il  haa  run  nun  still  fltttlian  rests- 
lance  and  is  under  siege 

In  some  instances,  such  aa  Ru- 
gnjrto.  Rnantan  l  roal  lorrca  have  or- 
ilered  Cmal  nvili.ius  In  Iravr.  The 
Ironps  have  iianstwittrd  iIip  rrfugrrs 
to  Cinaihrld  ullages  in  south 
western  fWnia  and  inalallcd  them  in 
homes  Ihe  Gnat  Inters  had  aeired 
from  their  Muslim  owners 

The  Bosnian  arntv  a  summer  of- 
fensive has  had  I  wo  Itev  nbrcclivcx. 
according    f"    I'  N     and    Luropeaii 


sources  First,  it  has  sought  to  con- 
solidate Muslim  control  over  Ihe  fu- 
ture heartland  of  a  Muslim  republic 
stretching  from  Tuzla  m  Ihe  north 
and  past  Sarajevo  to  the  south. 

Secondly,  it  has  tried  to  push 
through  Croat  held  territory  <n 
southwestern  Bosnia  to  establish  a 
Muslim  coin  rolled  land  corridor  In 
Ihe  Adriatic  Sea. 

But  a  strong  Croat  military  and 
< ivilian  presence  in  Prozor  and  M<»- 
star.  and  a  Croat  counleroffensive 
around  C.omn  Vakuf  remain  major 
obstacles  lo  achieving  the  land  cor- 
ridor goal. 

According  lo  a  document  distrib- 
uted by  the  Bosnian  Croats  in  Gene- 
va in  early  August,  since  April  16  Ihe 
Muslim-led  Bosnian  army  had  taken 
1 .4 10  square  miles  of  land  previously 
controlled  by  the  Croat  militia. 

The  document  charged  that  Ihe 
Muslim-led  army  had  forced  Croat 
residents  from  six  towns  and  153 
villages  since  April.  Thai  is  moie 
than  Ihe  the  sue  towns  and  68  vil- 
lages the  document  said  were  eth- 
nically "cleansed"  by  Bosnian  Serb 
forces  since  October  1991. 

While  Bosnian  President  Alija  Izel- 
hegovtc.  a  Muslim,  was  decrying  a 
continuing  Serb  offensive  around 
Sarajevo  in  late  July  that  breached  a 
cease  lire  agreement,  his  army  was 
doing  the  same  thing  m  cential  Bos- 
ma. 

The  all-out  struggle  for  territory 
between  Bosnian  Muslims  and 
Croats,  erstwhile  allies,  began  in 
mid  April,  wuh  the  Croats  gcnerallv 
blamed  for  launching  the  first  ollen 


shre  to  consolidate  their  territory. 
But  starling  in  early  June.  Ihe  Mus- 
lim-led Bosnian  army  retaliated  with 
a  well-coordinated  and  highly  suc- 
cessful counteroffensrve. 

The  Muslim  military  offensive  has 
left  a  series  of  isnUted  Croat  en- 
claves insule  Muslun-lield  territory. 
tiurrontig  the  Muslim  enclaves  uf 
Srebrenica.  Zepa  and  Gorxfde  within 
Sr-rh-held  leiruorv  in  eastern  Bos- 
ma.  Croat  towns  such  as  Vares. 
Ilusovaea.  Proror  and  Kisehak  are 
struggling  tn  survive  inside  Muslim- 
held  territory. 

A  five-month  Croat  blockade  of  all 
roads  into  central  Bosnia  has  only 
served  to  worsen  conditions  for  the 
remaining  Croal  population.  The 
blockade  has  prevented  delivery  of 
humanitarian  food  supplies,  although 
a  representative  of  Ihe  U.N.  High 
Commissioner  (or  Refugees  in  Sara- 
jevo reported  Sept.  S  that  20  con- 
voys had  suddenly  been  allowed 
through 

D.N.  and  European  monilnrs  sav 
Ihe  fate  ol  Ihe  rcmainine  Croats  ami 
Serbs  within  Musluu-hi  Id  lauds  has 
been  made  more  problematic  hv  Hie 
Rosman  Serb  campaign  <iure  earlv 
spring  tn  push  IIMI.OIMt  Muslims  nut 
of  Serh-held  territories 

lhese  refugees  drifted  into  Mus- 
lim-dominated towns  such  as  l-'nrmra 
and  changed  Ihe  ethnic  balance. 
making  demands  on  local  authorities 
lo  turn  over  vacanl,  and  even  occu- 
pied. Croal  homes  to  them. 

In  addition,  the  latest  Geneva 
peace  plan  to  partition  llosnta  intn 
Croat.   Muslim   and  Serb  lepublus 


has  made  things  worse  fur  Croats 
and  Serbs  in  Muslim-held  areas. 

"There  are  .100.000  refugees  in 
Icentral  Bosma|  who  won  I  be  able  lo 
go  back  home,  land  are!  demanding 
the  homes  of  Croats  and  Serbs  m  the 
area."  said  an  EC  representative  tn 
Zenica.  He  said  the  partition  plan  had 
been  a  disaster  for  the  elforts  of  Ihe 
European  Community,  which  has  a 
large  monitoring  operation  in  central 
Bosnia  to  promote  inter-elhmc  co- 
operation. 

"The  idea  of  the  division  of  the 
country  is  the  complete  opposite  of 
what  we  hare  been  working  to 
achieve  on  the  ground."  he  said  dur- 
ing a  recent  interview  in  Zenica.  "We 
were  tr-ymg  to  work  to  keep  people 
together." 

From  ihe  start  of  the  war  in  April 
1992  until  early  July  1993.  this  for- 
merly miied  town,  which  resembles 
an  Alpine  Swiss  mountain  village 
badly  damaged  by  artillery  and  fires. 
was  a  model  of  Muslim-Croat  peace- 
ful coexistence 

But  on  July  2.  ihe  Bosnian  army 
carried  out  what  its  Muslim  com- 
mander here  described  as  a  preemp- 
tive strike"  agamst  the  Croat  mibtia. 
starting  with  a  massive  shelling  of 
Ihe  Croat  sector  of  the  town.  Within 
two  weeks,  the  Bosnian  army  had 
driven  out  the  militia  and  all  but  200 
of  the  town's  6.600  Croats. 

Just  two  days  before  the  Busman 
army  action,  the  former  commander 
uf  U.N.  forces  in  Bosnia.  French  Lt. 
Gen.  Philippe  Morilfnn.  had  conn- 
liere  to  celebrate  ihe  successful 
Croat-Muslim  cooperation  m  Form,  a 
which  had  been  declared  hv  his  com- 
mand "an  area  nf  special  interest ." 

Muslim  authorities  here  subse- 
quently appeared  embarrassed,  se- 
cretive and  defensive  about  what  had 
happened. 

Gen.  Origan  Andnc.  chief  of  staff 
of  Ihe  Bosnian  army  s  6th  Corps, 
sought  to  pass  himself  off  to  Western 
reporters  as  a  "liaison  olficer"  and 
refused  lo  disclose  either  his  real 
position  or  rank.  He  said  he  was  a 
Muslim  with  a  Croat  wife  and  Seib 
mother,  adding.  T  am  a  real  Bosnian 
and  I  believe  it  heller  for  all  three 
nationalities  (Croats  Serbs  and  Mus- 
lims! lo  stav  tngetlit-r 

He  assured  reporters  that  the 
Croats  ol  Fojnica  arc  Iree  tn  return 
and  the  town  a  Muslim  authorities 
waul  to  restore  its  ethnirallv  mixed 
character  All  honest  Croats  without 
blood  on  their  hands  can  ennte  hark. 
he  said. 

But  the  town  s  Muslim  mayor, 
Nasir  Selimovic.  said  he  was  not 
about  to  go  lo  Kisclnk.  where  the 
town  s  Croat  population  had  fled,  to 
appeal  lo  litem  to  return,  and  he 
doubted  nianv  would  any-wav. 


o 


73-703   (64) 


BOSTON  PUBLIC  LIBRARY 

llllllilHL 

3  9999  05706  6571 


ISBN   0-16-041783-X 


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